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DELIMITING RELIGION IN THE
CONSTITUTION: A CLASSIFICATION
PROBLEM
ANITA BOWSER*
INTRODUCTION

The American system of church-state relations rests on very
narrow constitutional grounds. The original Constitution provided
simply that no religious test may be required for any office or public
trust under the new central government, and the Bill of Rights added
only that the national government may not establish religion or
prohibit its free exercise. The latter restrictions were extended to
state governments through the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.
These constitutional provisions have both the virtue of being
compact and the vice of being so indefinite as to have limited value as
guidelines. The operative word is religion; it is religion which may
not be established or restricted in its exercise or made the content of a
qualifying test for federal office. Its meaning, therefore, is central to
all three provisions and so to the whole structure of American
church-state relations. Yet, for all its importance as the pivotal
element in our church-state arrangement, the term religion was left
undefined. It is possible that here, as elsewhere in the deliberations
of the Framers, ambiguity was the price of consensus, that the
imprecision was intentional, and that the task of delimiting the term
precisely was purposely left to later generations. Be that as it may,
later generations were bequeathed no guidance by the authors
concerning the exact meaning of the religion clauses.
Delimiting the term "religion" in the first amendment of the
Constitution is an ongoing concern for the courts and one that is not
easily within reach of a practical solution. Essentially a problem of
statutory construction, the judicial burden is to determine how the
concept "religion" is to be interpreted in areas where the viewpoints
of government and citizens differ. What beliefs and practices shall
be included under the term? What characteristics shall be regarded
as legally significant and what values or what criteria of valid law
*
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shall be applied to identify the distinctions and differences? Further,
what are the limitations placed on a legal definition of religion?
Of necessity, any delimiting process involves classification. In its
review of equal protection cases, the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized that a state cannot function adequately unless it
distinguishes its citizens for various purposes and treats some of
them differently from others.1 However, where such classifications
are permitted and classes of citizens are not treated similarly, the
Court has demanded that the statutory classification be rationally
related to the purpose of the statute. 2 The difficult question then
becomes how to formulate a legislative purpose against which the
3
rationality of the statutory classification can be tested.
Since classifying is necessarily a nondeductive procedure, the
emphasis upon logic in the law can serve to focus attention only upon
the subsidiary rather than central aspects of the legal decisional
process. A judge cannot appeal to the canons of logic to decide
whether a given classification is the necessary or the correct one.4
Because classification cannot be carried on deductively the task is an
inherently arbitrary one. Value choices intrude, making any
definitional effort a problem of normation.5 The judiciary must
articulate a norm broad enough, one which fits the facts of the case
before it and which can transcend the particular decision.6 However,
the norm must be not so broad as to render the classification
meaningless. Moreover, if a norm is articulated too narrowly, it
could be discriminatory and be in violation of one or both of the
religion clauses of the first amendment. Serious questions would
arise, consequently, regarding the nature of the norm itself.
Given that a norm is an expression of a collective value, how is
the value to be identified, selected and applied? Is the value a
1. In George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 843 (1953), it was stated: "Courts do not look for perfect equality in legislative
classifications. They will not condemn a classification so long as a reasonable ground
exists for inclusion or exclusion." See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
3. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065,
1076-77 (1969) (other standards for review).
4. For an elaboration of this point see R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL
DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION 32-33 (1961).

5. "Normation" is a term once employed by Karl Llewellyn in The
Normative, The Legal, and the Law Jobs: The Problem of JuristicMethod, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 661, 686 n.100 (1960).
6. See Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 610 (1960).
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reflection of a common aim of what ought to be? Is it a societal
expectation of what will be, or is it a reaction to some behavioral
manifestation expressed in terms of sanctions? 7 Common aims, it has
been asserted, involve polycentric questions, that is, "questions not
easily settled by the adjudicative process because of their
unavoidable intersection with problems not primarily legal and
constitutional."8 If the norm governs behavior, how much deviation is
permitted before the standard is no longer considered a norm? Stated
otherwise, can a distinction be made between attributes of norms that
are true by definition and those that are contingent?9
Where religious beliefs overlap with secular interests, as in the
conscientious objector disputes, 10 and it is not known whether a belief
is religious or secular, the Court might be forced to define religious or
conscientious beliefs on the basis of some extra-legal consideration in
the interests of effecting social justice. In United States v. Seeger,"
for example, the Court attempted a psychological test to determine
what role a professed belief played in the life of the possessor of the
12
belief. The threshold question of sincerity also had to be resolved.
The content of the belief supposedly was not a criterion for judging,
nor was the source of the belief, whether internally derived or
externally compelled. 13 This kind of functional deliberation requires
a difficult and intuitive factual determination, one that is arbitrary
in the sense that the decision could be predicated on any one of many
varying psychological, extant concepts concerning the nature of
man, 14 even one that is not clearly justifiable. In earlier cases
7. This distinction of norms is made in Gibbs, Norms: The Problem of
Definition and Classification, 70 AM. J. Soc. 568 (1965).
8. See Miller & Howell, supra note 6, at 687, where it is contended that
"organization by common aims" also implies a national consensus which is not yet
determined for most controversial issues.
9. See Gibbs, supra note 7, at 586. Gibbs explains that these are "attributes
which vary from one norm to the next and, therefore, are not relevant for a generic
definition of norms ......
10. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); United States v.
Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States
v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
11. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
12. Id. at 176.
13. Id. In Seeger, the Court professed to reject a classification based on belief
content, yet, paradoxically, it made an appeal to theology in its examination of various
statements from theologians concerning the meaning of religion. Id. at 180, 183.
14. See Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327
(1969) ("no psychological analysis can provide the basis for a legal definition excluding
any class of conscientious beliefs from protection"); cf. Goldstein, Psychoanalysis and
Ji'isprude)ice.77 YALE L.J. 1053 (1968) (contending that the disciplines of psychoanalysis and jurisprudence are relevant).
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involving the meaning of religion, the Court had indicated that it
would concern itself exclusively with factors of externality in spite of
the fact that the first amendment speaks in terms of protecting free
exercise and not simply beliefs. 15
If the Court should attempt a subject-matter definition of
religion, citing as essential some fundamental quality for a belief or
act, such as a moral or ethical principle, the definition would not be
immune from attack as a possible establishment violation, for the
problem of discrimination would arise against those not holding the
particularly described religious tenet. In Seeger, the "parallel
position" standard was employed: "whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly
qualifies for the exemption."1 6 Such a standard introduces into the
definition of religion elements of discrimination in that the orthodox
belief is used as a standard for reference. This arbitrarily gives the
orthodox belief a favored position over that belief not similarly
situated.
Finally, any attempt to distinguish religious beliefs and
practices from secular ones by marking dividing lines among
phenomena that are not clearly distinguishable introduces linguistic
complexities which would render the resulting definition imprecise
and ineffective as law. An establishment or free exercise claim could
be made by anyone intentionally or inadvertently left out of the
classification. A related problem would be a division of concepts into
sharply distinct categories, placing labels on them such as "religious
act" or "religious non-act" and confusing the labels for the thing
itself.
This article considers some of the problems inherent in the legal
definition of religion and seeks to determine whether the decisions of
the Supreme Court in establishment and free exercise cases supply
the ingredients of a legal definition of religion.
15. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court in
Reynolds stipulated that although laws "cannot interfere with mere religious belief
and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. In United States v. Ballard, 322
U.S. 78 (1944), the Court held that it was no concern of government to inquire into the
truth or falsity of spiritual matters. This distinction, however, could not be
maintained. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
16. 380 U.S. at 176. The Court in this instance was interpreting a statute
pertaining to the conscientious objector status and not the first amendment. The
statute reads: "Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or
philosophical views or a merely personal moral code." 50 U.S.C. § 459(j) (1964).
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EVOLUTION OF A LEGAL CATEGORY: THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CASES AND THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

A valid legal classification is one which includes "all persons
7
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law."'
Additional requirements imposed by the Supreme Court are that
"[t]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
17.

F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
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to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."' 8 Classifications which are
legally suspect have been described as those which exclude groups
that are in special need of protection because the are "discrete and
insular" minorities. 19 This is best exemplified in the conscientious
objector cases.
Initially, in the first congressional military exemption act,
enacted in 1864, conscientious objector classification was limited to
members of the historic peace churches20 or to those "who shall be
oath or affirmation declare that they are conscientiously opposed to
the bearing of arms, and who are prohibited from doing so by the
rules and articles of faith and practice of said religious
denominations."2 1 Realizing the narrow scope of this statute in that it
covered only a few churches, Congress in 1917 broadened the
classification to include "any well-recognized religious sect or
organization . . . whose existing creed or principles forbid its
members to participate in war in any form and whose religious
convictions are against war."22 The above exemption was broadened
even further in the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act to
include anyone "who, by reason of religious training and belief is
conscientiously opposed to war in any form."2 3
The ambiguity of the "religious training and belief" language
provoked questions concerning the scope of the exemption under the
Act; various interpretations were given in the circuit courts.24 One
18. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
1076-1132 (1969); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, And Equal Protection, 82
YALE L.J. 123 (1972).
19. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938). See also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Churches included in this classification were Mennonites, Brethren,
Molakans, Christadelphians and Friends. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 379; Act
of May 18, 1917, Pub. L. No. 12, § 1, 40 Stat. 76. Virtually all the colonial military
laws provided for conscientious objector status as did the Continental Congress.
21. Act of Feb. 2, 1864, ch. 13, § 17, 13 Stat. 9.
22. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.
23. 54 Stat. 885, § 5(g).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943), where a
liberal interpretation was read into the statute by Justice Augustus Hand who
asserted:
Religious belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a
means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe
....a sense common to men in the most primitive and in the most highly
civilized societies. It accepts the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by
it. It is a belief finding expression in a conscience which categorically
requires the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.
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opinion that momentarily prevailed came from the Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Berman,25 where an attempt was made at narrowing
the classification. It was asserted in Berman that:
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious
training and belief" is plain language, and was written into
the statute for the specific purpose of distinguishing
between a conscientious social belief, or a sincere devotion
to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based an
individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority
26
higher and beyond any worldly one.
Quoting from Chief Justice Hughes's dissenting opinion in United
States v. Macintosh27 to the effect that "the essence of religion is belief
in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, ' the Berman court went on to say: "No matter
how pure and admirable this standard may be, and no matter how
devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy and morals and social policy
without the concept of deity cannot be said to be religion in the sense
of that term as it is used in the statute.'29
Apparently seeking to avoid further difficulties of interpretation and seeking perhaps to preclude a broadened classification, Congress attempted by way of an amendment to the
Selective Service Act to formulate a definition of its own. 30 By
implicitly endorsing the Berman position, but substituting, without
explanation, the term "Supreme Being" for "God," it defined
"religious training and belief" as "an individual's belief in a relation
to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from
any human relation, but does not include essentially political,
Id. at 708. In United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943), a
petitioner who believed that "war is ethically and inevitably wrong" was considered
to be within the religious category required by the Act. In United States ex rel. Reel
v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845, 848 (2d Cir. 1944), it was held: "The relater can only secure
exemption if it is found that the Director of Selective Service has held that he
objected to participation in any war under any circumstances because of the
compelling voice of his conscience."
25. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
26. Id. at 380.
27. 283 U.S. 605 (1931). Macintosh involved a petition for naturalization.
Respondent stated in his application form for citizenship that he would bear arms in
defense of the United States only if he felt "morally justified" to do so. The Court held
such a qualified commitment insufficient, contending that conscientious objectors
enjoyed their status not as a constitutional necessity, but rather as "legislative grace."
28. 156 F.2d at 381.
29. Id.
30. Selective Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
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sociological or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code."31
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit subsequently faced
a challenge to the validity of the Selective Service Act amendment on
the basis of what it considered grave constitutional violations of first
and fifth amendment rights.0 2 It was felt that those who adhered to
no religion would be discriminated against and those who could not
identify their beliefs with a deity would likewise be denied equal
status under the law. Moreover, as had been affirmed in Torcaso v.
Watkins,3 3 neither the federal government nor a state government
could constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of
God as against thsoe religions founded on different beliefs."3 On the
basis of the Torcaso holding, therefore, conscientious objector
exemptions seemingly should not be predicated on a religious
standard, for to do so would give preferential status to believers over
non-believers. This preference would result in a discriminatory
classification violative not only of the first amendment, but of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment as well.
Parallel Position Test
The circuits decided three related cases, United States v.
Jakobson35 Peter v. United States,36 and United States v. Seeger37
involving draft board denial of conscientious objector status to
registrants who failed to base their objections to war on a belief in a
Supreme Being. The Supreme Court of the United States, in
response to the need for further clarification of the vague "religious
training and belief' requirement, attempted to resolve the difficulty
under the consolidated case of United States v. Seeger.3 8 Petitioner
Jakobson was a humanist who contended that his beliefs flowed not
vertically but horizontally toward his fellow man. He believed in "an
ultimate cause," or "creator of all existence" which he alluded to as
"Godness."3 9 For him "Godness" was a part of all humanity. His
conclusion was that the "taking of human life is incompatible with
The

SEEGER

31.
32.

Id. at § 6(j).
United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

367 U.S. 488
Id. at 495.
325 F.2d 409
324 F.2d 173
326 F.2d 846

(1961).
(2d Cir. 1963).
(9th Cir. 1963).
(2d Cir. 1964).

38. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
39.

325 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1963).
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the order of the universe. '40 Holding that Jakobson's beliefs
comported with the notion of theism that Congress intended, the
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision and granted
exemption.
Peter, also a humanist, felt that his actions were motivated by a
feeling of relationship and love toward other human beings. "Since
human life is for me a final value," Peter stated, "I consider it a
violation of moral law to take human life."' 41 He added, "You could call
that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen
to be the words I use. '42 His beliefs, nonetheless, were held to come
under the statutory classification. Seeger, an agnostic, refused to
assert a simple belief or disbelief in a deity. Claiming that "the
existence of God cannot be proven or disproven, and the essence of
His nature cannot be determined," 43 he refused to seek protection
under the statute, but chose, instead, to challenge its constitu44
tionality.
Apparently looking for a way to avoid invalidating the statute,
the Supreme Court chose not to rule on the constitutional issues posed
by Seeger. Instead, it carefully designed a test to determine whether
an objection to war was religious under the statute, a test that would
be broad enough to bring the beliefs of all three men within the
statutory exemption. The Court declared that: "[a] sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place
parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption comes within the statutory definition." 45 Contending
that the test avoids due process problems, Justice Clark, in speaking
for the majority, explained: "This construction avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting
some and excluding others, and is in accord with the well-established
40. Id. at 412.
41. 324 F.2d 173, 174 n.2 (9th Cir. 1963).
42. Id. at 176-77.
43. 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d Cir. 1964). Seeger described his beliefs in the
following way:
Personally, I do not believe that a person can give his life meaning by
doing something worthwhile with it, i.e., by relating his existence in a
constructive and compassionate way to the problems of his social
environment. In this sense pacifism, among other things, is for me a
transcendent concern and it is in this respect that I consider myself
religious.
Id.
44. Seeger challenged the statute on the basis of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment, the free exercise clause of the first amendment, and article VI, § 3
of the Constitution barring a religious test for office holding.
45. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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congressional policy of equal treatment for those
whose opposition
46
to service is grounded in their religious tenets.
Moreover, Justice Clark felt that a conviction based upon
religious training and belief would include "all sincere religious
beliefs which are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to
which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately
dependent."47 By including Seeger's beliefs within the scope of the
statute that employed the term "Supreme Being," the Court thereby
hoped to avoid a review of the statute's most obvious infirmity, the
preference of theism over nontheism. In effect the test eliminated
"religion" as a consideration for exemption. Although defining
religion for the purposes of the statute by analogy to traditional
beliefs in a Supreme Being, the Seeger test did not distinguish, or
possibly it could not distinguish, religious beliefs from beliefs
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical. 48
In the 1948 Selective Service Act, Congress had attempted to
define religion by drawing a sharp line between beliefs founded upon
an individual's relationship to a Supreme Being and beliefs founded
on a philosophical or a personal moral code. Similarly, the Seeger
Court attempted to draw a demarcation line between beliefs considered religious under the statute and those not so considered. Its
approach sought to discover not the content of the belief, but rather
the role the belief plays in the life of the possessor. This role thus
becomes the significant element in deciding whether a belief is
religious. By logical extension, however, its parallel belief test might
even classify a personal moral code as religious if the belief is
sincerely held and is based upon a power or being or upon a faith to
which all else is subordinate.
Seemingly, it was not the intent of the Seeger Court to define
religion, lest any presumption or arbitrariness evolve into problems
of establishment.4 9 Rather, it relied upon certain carefully selected
religious treatises, the general thrust of which was to convey the idea
46. Id. at 177.
47.

Id.

48. The Court indicated that: "these judgments have historically been
reserved for the Government, and in matters which can be said to fall within these
areas the conviction of the individual has never been permitted to override that of the
state." Id. at 173.
49. The Court considered its problem a narrow one: "Does the term
'Supreme Being' as used in § 6(j) mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a
power or being, or a faith, 'to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is
ultimately dependent'?" In considering the question, the Court's intent was to "resolve
it solely in relation to the language of § 6(j) and not otherwise." Id. at 174.
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that the Court desired, primarily, that religion encompass something

more than a mere belief in a Supreme Being. For example, the Court
quoted with approval such an eminent theologian as Dr. Paul Tillich:
And if the word [God] has not much meaning for you,
translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the
source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you
take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to
do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have

learned about God...

.0

WELSH Precludes Exemption for Political Belief
Subsequent

to the Seeger decision,

Congress enacted the

Military Selective Service Act of 1967 which eliminated the Supreme
Being terminology from the statute's definition of religion. 51 The
reason for the deletion is uncertain. It was felt by some members of
Congress, at least, that the Seeger Court had unduly broadened the
exemption with its use of the term. There was a fear that the Court's
employment of relativism and its concentration on manner rather

than on content of belief would open wide the conscientious objector
facet of the statute, permitting virtually anyone to come under its
protection. One explanation of the confusion is provided by Senator
Russell Long, who stated:
50. Id. at 187 (emphasis added by Court), quoting P. TILLICH, THE SHAKING
authorities consulted include: ROBINSON,
bishop stated: "In place of a God who is
literally or physically 'up there,' we have accepted, as part of our mental furniture, a
God who is spiritually or metaphysically 'out there'...." Dr. David Saville Muzzey, a
leader in the Ethical Culture Movement, states in ETHICS AS A RELIGION 183 (1951),
"Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man can neither prove nor
disprove, the ethical concept is founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric,
not theocentric." The Schema of the recent Ecumenical Council of the Catholic
Church on the Church's relations with non-Christians was cited: "The Church regards
with sincere reverence those ways of action and of life, precepts and teachings which,
although they differ from the ones she sets forth, reflect nonetheless a ray of that
Truth which enlightens all men." Id. at 182.
51. The section now reads:
OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948). Other
HONEST To GOD 181 (1963), in which the

Nothing contained in this title .

.

. shall be construed to require any

person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participating in war in any form. As
used in this subsection, the term "religious training and belief" does not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a
merely personal moral code.
50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (Supp. 1973).
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Congress thought that we were tightening up this law in
1948, but the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that
we were loosening it, were making it easier to secure an
exemption. We thought we were making it harder, but
sometimes the English language doesn't mean the same
thing, apparently, to members of Congress and to the
52
Supreme Court.
Justice Harlan, who had endorsed the majority opinion in
Seeger, later was to express doubt concerning the Court's
interpretation. In another conscientious objector case, Welsh v.
United States,53 he indicated that Congress had intended to exempt
only those who adhered to theistic notions and not those adherents of
nontheistic views.&5 Nor was it the intent of Congress, he claimed, to
exempt those whose beliefs were not acquired through "religion" in
the conventional way.5 5 He did believe, however, that the statutory
provision as properly construed violated the religion clauses of the
first amendment 6
But, he felt, when a statutory provision is
unconstitutional because of underinclusion, nullification of the
provision is not the only possible remedy. The Court may, if it deems
it more appropriate, extend the statute's coverage to include others in
the classification.5 7 Arguing that the Court had gone far beyond the
permissible bounds of avoidance, Justice Harlan nonetheless
accepted the Seeger Court's conscientious objector test, "not as a
reflection of congressional statutory intent but as [a] patchwork of
judicial making that cures the defect of underinclusion" in the statute
and which "can be administered by local boards in the usual course of
business.'"
Welsh was opposed to participation in war in any form,
characterizing his beliefs as non-religious in nature.
In his
application for conscientious objector status he wrote:
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its
living; therefore, I will not injure or kill another human
being. This belief (and the corresponding "duty" to abstain
52. See Hearings on S.B. 1432 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967). For additional explanations and recommendations see
Hearings on the Review of the Administration and Operation of the Selective Service
System Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).

53. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

348-50 (concurring opinion).
351-54.
361-67.
342-43.
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from violence toward another person) is not "superior to
those arising from any human relation." On the contrary:
it is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore,
conscientiously comply with the Government's insistence
that I assume duties which I feel are immoral and totally
59
repugnant.
The Court held that Welsh's beliefs "function as a religion in his
life,' '6 0 thus clearly putting him within the exempted category.
Justice Black stated for the majority:
If an individual deeply and sincerely holds beliefs which
are purely ethical or moral in source and content but which
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience to
refrain from participating in war.., those beliefs certainly
occupy in the life of that individual "a place parallel to that
filled by ...

God" in traditionally religious persons ....

[S]uch an individual is as -much entitled to a "religious"
conscientious objector exemption . . . as is someone who

derives his conscientious opposition to war from traditional
61
religious convictions.
While continuing to circumvent the issue of establishment, the Welsh
Court, by its insistence that a secular belief should have equality of
treatment with the religious belief, effectively rendered the
"religious training and belief' requirement of the statute inoperative.
The majority acknowledged that once having decided that all
religious conscientious objectors were entitled to the exemption, the
more serious problem of determining which beliefs were "religious"
within the meaning of the statute was presented. 62 The Court
interpreted its Seeger ruling to require of a conscientious objector to
all war that, "[the] opposition to war stem from the registrant's
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and
that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions.' r6
The Court saw two groups of registrants which obviously did not
fall within the exempted category: "those whose beliefs are not deeply
held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon moral,
ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
59. Id. at 343
60.
61.
62.
63.

(emphasis in original).

Id. at 340.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 342.
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considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency."64 The Court
went on to say that in applying the statute to those whose views are
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical" or to those who
have a "merely personal moral code," it should be remembered that:
"these exclusions are definitional and do not therefore restrict the
category of persons who are conscientious objectors by 'religious
training and belief.' ,65
The effect of the Welsh decision was to alter and greatly expand
the legal notion of religion. Seemingly, the intent of Congress was not
to include considerations of sociology, politics, and philosophy within
its statutory class of objectors. However, Justice Black's majority
opinion embodied just such an inclusion. The statute unequivocally
states that conscientious opposition predicated upon a merely
personal moral or ethical code ought not be considered. In spite of
this, a fusion of religion with morality was effected by Justice Black,
who placed those moral and ethical beliefs, and possibly also those
somewhat political, 66 regardless of source and content, within the
Seeger norm. The Court thus created a new standard that permitted
an exemption for "all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace 6if7
they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war."
By restricting the objection criteria to sincerity and opposition to
participation in war in any form, Justice Black was able to sidestep
first amendment difficulties. Apparently all that Welsh placed
outside the exempted category were those beliefs that are "purely"
68
political.
The Court also subtly altered the Seeger requirement that a
religious belief be one that occupies a place parallel to the belief held
by those who believed in a Supreme Being and one that is sincere. In
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 343.

66. Id. at 342. In Welsh the majority held that conscientious objection to war
can be based in part on a "perception of world politics." The Court maintained:
We certainly do not think that § 6(j)'s exclusion of those persons with
"essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code" should be read to exclude those who hold strong
beliefs about our domestic and foreign affairs or even those whose
conscientious objection to participation in all wars is founded to substantial extent upon considerations of public policy.

Id.
67. Id. at 342-44.
68. Id. Placed outside would be those beliefs that rest "solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." Id.
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Welsh the demand is that the belief "function" as a religion and be
held with the strength of traditional convictions.
In Justice Harlan's view the majority opinion played havoc with
the statute. 9 He criticized the Court for its "wholly emasculated
construction" merely to avoid facing the constitutional question, 70
and he attempted, therefore, to predicate his opinion on a
constitutional base. He asked "whether a statute that defers to the
individual's conscience only when his views emanate from adherence
to theistic religious beliefs is within the power of Congress?"7' 1 He
perceived the Court's duty as one where it "must survey meticulously
the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it
were, religious gerrymanders.7

2

Selective Objection and the Principle of Neutrality
Soon after the Welsh decision, two cases arose which attempted
to force a consideration of the constitutional issue. Gillette v. United
States7 3 and Negre v. Larsen74 involved conscientious objectors who
distinguished between what were deemed just and unjust wars.
Gillette, because of his humanistic beliefs, objected to becoming
involved in what he considered an unjust war: 5 His local draft board,
however, refused to classify him as a conscientious objector. Although
he expressed a willingness to fight in some wars, Gillette's pacifism
was selective. On the basis that the statutory provision required
opposition to participation to war in any form, the exemption was
denied. Negre, a devout Roman Catholic, likewise believed that he
had a religious obligation to differentiate between just and unjust
wars. After he was inducted into the army and ordered to Viet Nam,
69. Id. at 351 (concurring). In his words the Court "performed a lobotomy"
on the statute.
70. Id. at 357.
71. Id. at 356.
72. Id. at 357. Mr. Justice Harlan argued: "In any particular case, the
critical question is whether the scope of legislation encircles a class so broad that it
can be fairly concluded that [all groups that] could be thought to fall within the
natural perimeter [are included]." Id., quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
73. 401 U.S. 437 (1971). See also United States v. McFadden, 309 F. Supp.
502 (N.D. Cal. 1970), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 1006 (1971) (in light of Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)); United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D.
Mass. 1969), appeal dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1971).
74. 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), affd sub nom. Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971).
75. 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971). Gillette defined "humanism" as "respect and
love for man, faith in his inherent goodness and perfectability, and confidence in his
capability to improve some of the human condition."
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he applied for discharge as a conscientious objector and sought
habeas corpus relief when his application was rejected. His claim
was also disallowed by the Supreme Court. Both Gillette and Negre
argued that favoring the traditional pacifist sects over those faiths
which distinguish between just and unjust wars violated their
constitutional rights.
In these cases involving conscientious objection on a selective
basis, two contradistinctive problems are seen. On the one hand, if no
exemption were given to the conscientious objector who holds a
sincere belief that a particular war is morally wrong, and that belief
occupies in the objector's scale of values a place equal to that of the
general objector, then, under the Seeger test, to grant exemption to
the objector to all wars and not to the objector to one specific war
shows a preference of one religion over the other. This is clearly a
violation of the establishment clause. If, on the other hand, the
selective objector's sincere belief is not viewed as religion, the
granting of the exemption to the objector to all wars on religious
grounds constitutes a preference for religion over non-religion and is
also a violation of the establishment clause, being a breach of the
principle of neutrality that the Court professes 6 Also violated would
be the objector's free exercise of religion in that he would be
compelled to participate in a war that would violate his conscience.7 v
Answering Gillette's and Negre's claim that the conscientious
objector statute "impermissibly discriminates among types of
religious belief and affiliation"7 8 and thus prevents neutrality, the
Court insisted that a congressional classification violates neutrality
only if it shows bias on the face of the statute, or if the effect is
discriminatory toward religions. 79 Implying that a selective objector
76. See Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947).
77. In United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), it was suggested that
the rationale behind Congress' recognition of conscientious objector status is "conscience." The Chief Justice declared that, "in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral
power higher than the State has always been maintained." Id. at 633 (Hughes, C.J.,
dissenting).
78. 401 U.S. at 449.
79. Id. at 450. Compare Justice Marshall's statement: "[T]he Establishment
Clause stands at least for the proposition that when government activities touch on
the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, even-handed in operation, and
neutral in primary impact," with one made by Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 468 (1961), to the effect that a state action would lose its
presumption of neutrality "only if the absence of any substantial legislative purpose
other than a religious one is made to appear." Justice White, dissenting in Welsh,
referred to this statement, 398 U.S. at 369, and Justice Marshall seemingly is
following Justice White's position.
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to war is political while the general objector is religious, Justice
Marshall, for the majority, drew an arbitrary line between the two
types and thereby sought to avoid the difficult problem of having to
prove that the selective objector's beliefs were not religious. While
formally it was the obligation of the courts to discover or declare the
secular and neutral purpose of a statute, Justice Marshall
transferred this burden to the selective objector; the petitioner would
now be required to establish "the absence of a neutral, secular basis
for the lines government has drawn."80
With this unorthodox
pronouncement, the Court inveighed upon the protections given
"religion" under previous decisions. 81
In justification of its stand, the Court contended that opposition
to a particular war "could open the door to a general theory of
selective disobedience to law. '8 2 This same kind of reasoning could
also be applied to the absolute objector who is already possessed of an
exemption and who is, therefore, "outside the door." Presumably,
according to Justice Marshall's logic, such an objector would be in a
83
better position to disobey some other law in the name of his religion.
Undoubtedly, Justice Marshall's decision was based on a view once
articulated by Justice Cardozo:
The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus
extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance
of a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in
furtherance of any other end condemned by his conscience
as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment
has never yet been so exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of government.
80. Id. at 352. Ordinarily the burden of proof has been with the courts to
determine secular purpose. For a comprehensive treatment of statutory and procedural ways by which a claim of conscientious objection must be asserted, see Field,
Problems of Proof in Conscientious Objector Cases, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 870 (1972).
81. See specifically Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), in which the
burden was placed on the state "to carve out an exemption and to provide benefits for
those whose unavailability is due to their religious convictions." Id. at 420.
82. 401 U.S. at 455.
83. The Court presumably thought that a wide variety of beliefs could be
subsumed under the "objection to a particular war" statutory restriction, and
concluded, therefore, that the selective objector might "more likely be political and
nonconscientious than otherwise," and that "the difficulties sorting the two with a
sure hand are considerable." Id. at 456.
84. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245, 268 (1934)
(conscientious objection to participation in a R.O.T.C. program). See also Hanauer v.
Elkins, 217 Md. 213, 141 A.2d 903 (1958), appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 643 (1959).
Congress has not honored objection to payment of taxes and will find a means of
extracting them. See Field, supra note 80, at 949 n.315.
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It might be argued, however, that forcing an individual to kill in
violation of conscience is a demand separate and distinct from any
other governmental requirement. 85 Moreover, compelling a person to
act when his religion commands otherwise is seemingly a far greater
infringement of individual religious liberty than prohibiting an act
that is regarded as a religious expression by the individual.86 If both
the selective and the absolute objector were to seek avoidance from
some other governmental obligation on the basis of religious beliefs,
then the same Seeger standard with its sincerity requirement and its
questioning whether a belief is central or peripheral to a person's
hierarchy of values, or the Welsh test that construes conscience to
include both sincerely held religious beliefs and sincerely held nonreligious conscientious beliefs, should be equally available as a
defense. The fact that the selective objectors in the instant cases were
required to conform to a different standard from the total objector is
discriminatory, especially since an identical belief-to kill is a
violation of conscience-is at issue. Overlooking the possibility that a
selective objection could be sincerely held and involve a more
carefully thought-out moral judgment than that of a general
objection, 87 the Gillette Court, in what it considered a secular and
neutral justification for its decision, asserted dogmatically and
without explanation that" 'sincerity' is a concept that can bear only so
85. In United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1971), it was recognized that:
It would be a poor court indeed that could not discern the small
constitutional magnitude of the interest that a person has in avoiding al
helpful service whatsoever or in avoiding paying all general taxes
whatsoever. His objections, or course, may be sincere. But some sincere
objections have greater constitutional magnitude than others.
Id. at 910. See In re Jenison, 265 Minn. 96, 125 N.W.2d 588, rev'd. per curiam, 375
U.S. 14 (1963), wherein it was held that when a state attempts to compel an activity
that is contrary to one's religious belief, the state is subject to greater limitations than
when it passes a law forbidding the activity.
86. See Clark, Guidelinesfor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
345-46 (1969).
87. In United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1971), Judge Wyzanski commented that:
The sincerely conscientious man ...

always brings impressive creden-

tials. When he honestly believes that he will act wrongly if he kills, his
claim obviously has great magnitude. That magnitude is not appreciably
lessened if his belief relates not to war in general, but to a particular
war or to a particular type of war. Indeed a selective conscientious
objector might reflect a more discriminating study of the problem, a
more sensitive conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding.
297 F. Supp. at 908.
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much adjudicative weight. 8 8 Was it the intent of the Court,
therefore, to make the language of the statute limiting the opposition
to "participation in war in any form" the objective test for sincerity?
II.

THE CATEGORY OF SINCERITY: THE THRESHOLD QUESTION
FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION

The word "sincerity" is not mentioned in the statutes providing
for conscientious objector status, nor is the word mentioned in the
Constitution,89 but Congress, by providing for such exemptions, has
necessitated a determination of the meaning of the term 0 To
circumvent the issue by placing doubt on the weight that should be
given "sincerity," as was done by Justice Marshall in Gillette, is a
form of question-begging that introduces new ambiguities into the
test for religiousity. The fact that the term may be difficult to
analyze does not obviate the necessity for doing so.91 Furthermore, as
one judge on a lower court bench indicated: "The suggestion that
courts cannot tell a sincere from an insincere conscientious objector
underestimates what the judicial process performs every day." 2
It was only after several decades of litigation over the issue of
the precise role that conscience should play within the legal order
that a decision was reached in Seeger to make sincerity "the threshold
88. 401 U.S. at 457.
89. But see Selective Service Systems, Local Board Memorandum No. 107
(July 6, 1970), which purports to establish guidelines that comply with the Welsh
holding.
90. See Clancy & Weiss, The Conscientious Objector Exemption: Problems
In Conceptual Clarity And Constitutional Considerations, 17 ME. L. REV. 143, 145
(1965).

91. See Clark, supra note 86, at 338 ("fairness to the conscientious individual
is a major purpose of the free exercise clause"). See also Giannella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment. Part I: The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1423 (1967).
92. United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 909 (D. Mass. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1971); see also United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512
(7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946) (consideration was given to "sincerity"
in a mail order fraud case). In Dobkin v. District of Columbia, 194 A.2d 657 (D.C.
1963), a Jewish claimant argued that his freedom of religion was violated because he
was forced to be in court after sundown on Friday, his Sabbath. The court noted that
he went to work regularly on his Sabbath and, therefore, there was no valid basis for
his claim. See also United States v. Coffey, 429 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1970), in which the
court suggested ways sincerity could be ascertained - one way being reliance upon
prior statements or actions consistent or inconsistent with beliefs and depth of
commitment to beliefs. Various state courts have made an evaluation of "sincerity."
See, e.g., In re Grady, 61 Cal. 2d 887, 394 P.2d 728, 39 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1964); In re
Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
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question for religious exemption in every case." 93 "It is," Justice
Clark proclaimed, "a question of fact-a prime consideration to the
4
validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector.'9 If
this is so, how then might a factual basis for sincerity be ascertained?
Church Affiliation-A Departurefrom Neutrality?

One could assume that one way to such a determination would
be through recognition of a claimant's affiliation and identification
with a so-called peace church.9 5 The Quakers who fought in some
wars but who profess a total pacifist belief predicated in part on the
teachings of William Penn have traditionally come under this
classification.96 The Jehovah's Witnesses, on the other hand, who
maintain that all their workers are ordained ministers and rightfully
entitled to exemption, have encountered challenges to their selective
service claims 9 7 According to the tenets of their religion, Witnesses
may fight in their own defense and in defense of their families, their
property and their religious faith, but they are not permitted to serve
in the army of a mere political state. Consequently, they are not
considered absolute pacifists. 98 In several cases courts have held that
93.

380 U.S. at 183-85.

94.

Id.

95. Secretary of War Newton D. Baker assumed this to be so when he
testified before the House Military Affairs Committee regarding the proposed 1917
Selective Service Act. He stated, in part:
In the National Defense Act you have an exclusion of any person who has
conscientious beliefs against the bearing of arms .... That, of course,
makes the question of exclusion purely a question of individual statement, and as lawyers might say, of a self-serving declaration made after
the event. We recommend that the provison be modified so as to exclude
or exempt those who are actually members of a recognized society wich
has, as one of it tenets, the disapproval of war.
Hearings on the Selective Service Act Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs,
65th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1917).
96. In United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass 1969), appeal
dismissed, 399 U.S. 267 (1971), Judge Wyzanski noted that Quakers were automatically covered by statutes for exemption while Catholics were not. See also Act of
Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 379; Act of May 18, 1917, Pub. L. No. 12 § 1, 40 Stat. 76.
Chapter 15 of the 1917 Act specifies that conscientious objection status will be
afforded only to those objectors who belong to a recognized religious sect whose creed
would not allow participation in war.
97. See Donnici, Governmental Encouragement Of Religious Ideology: A
Study Of The Current Conscientious Objector Exemption From Military Service, 13 J.
PUB. L. 16 (1962). Donnici contends that the Jehovah's Witness more closely
resembles the political objector for he challenges the purpose of each particular war.
Id. at 40.
98. Id., citing Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1955).
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the Witnesses do not qualify for the statutory requirement of
complete pacifism on the grounds that their objections do not
conform to "war in any form."

9

In Sicurella v. United States,10 0

however, a claim by a Witness that he could not fight in carnal wars,
but would fight in defense of his brethren and in defense of his
property, was allowed. Predicated on the assumption that there will
be no divine commands given to wage war, the Court through Justice
Clark asserted that:
The test is not whether the registrant is opposed to all war,

but whether he is opposed, on religious grounds, to
participationin war. As to theocratic war, a petitioner's

willingness to fight on the orders of Jehovah is tempered by
the fact . . . their history records no such command since
Biblical times .... 101

In dissent, Justice Minton argued that the majority opinion left
02
Sicurella "the right to choose the wars in which he will fight."'
The theological basis for Roman Catholic belief in the "just war"
doctrine comes primarily from the teachings of St. Augustine 03 and
St. Thomas Aquinas. 0 4 It finds modern expression in the words of
Pope John XXIII, who declared:
Since the right to command is required by the moral order

and has its source in God, it follows that if civil authorities
99. See, e.g., Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 928 (1954); United States v. Pekarski, 207 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1953). In Taffs it
was stated, however, that Congress, "intended by this section to exempt those persons
from serving in the armed forces whose religious beliefs were opposed to any form of
participation in a flesh and blood war between nations." 208 F.2d at 331. See also
United States v. Hartman, 209 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1954) (the "in any form" language
must modify "participation"). This was the court's justification for disposing of the
government's claim that Congress meant to include theocratic wars within the
meaning of the statute. Id. at 371.
100. 348 U.S. 385 (1955).
101. Id. at 390-91 (emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 395.
103. See AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD XIX, vii (M. Dodds trans. 1950). War,
St. Augustine believed, was permissible to the Christian if it were for a just cause.
The cause would be in defense of the state against external enemies or for
punishment of wrongdoing. Moreover, war must be declared by a responsible
authority.
104. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part of the Second Part, question
105(3). St. Thomas extended St. Augustine's argument to provide that the war must
not only be waged for a just cause, but the intention of the ruler declaring the war
must be a right intention.
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pass laws or command anything opposed to the moral order

and consequently contrary to the will of God, neither the
laws made nor the authority granted can be binding on the
consciences of citizens, since God has more right to be
obeyed than men.10 5
Thus, the "just war" concept permits the petitioner the privilege of
determining, according to the dictates of his own conscience, whether
a certain war is unjust.10
In United States v. McFadden10 7 a Catholic claimant argued the

"just war" thesis before the lower courts. Recognizing that the
doctrine was a legitimate tenet of the Catholic faith, the district court
concluded that the objection was religious in nature rather than
political and that:
The statute in question clearly discriminates between those
who are opposed to all wars on religious grounds and those
who are opposed to particular wars on religious grounds.

In effect, this discriminates between the so-called "peace
Churches" and other religions such as the Catholic
Church. 08
As in Negre v. Larsen,10 9 an exemption was denied. Various
untenable reasons were given for the McFadden decision, 110 among
them: a substantial loss of manpower would result if the exemption
were granted;"' the morale of troops would be endangered;" 2 and
JOHN XXIII, PACEM IN TERRIS pt. 11 (1963).
106. See Potter, Conscientious Objection To ParticularWars, in 4 RELIGION
AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 44, 67-69 (1969). Potter lists the following mandates for the
"just war" concept: "A complex process of reasoning, combining fundamental
theological beliefs, theologically derived ethical norms, convictions concerning ultimate loyalties, and specific empirical input." Id. at 67.
107. 309 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Cal. 1970), vacated and remanded, 401 U.S. 1006
(1971). See also notes 74-82 supra and accompanying text.
108. 309 F. Supp. at 506.
109. 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), affd sub nom. Gillette v. United States, 401
U.S. 437 (1971). Negre's sincerity was not in question, however.
110. 309 F. Supp. at 507-08.
111. The loss of manpower argument is now mooted by the introduction of a
volunteer army. In the 1967 Marshall Commission Report little distinction was seen
between an absolute and selective objector. See also Rabin, When is a Religious Belief
Religious: United States v. Seeger and the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
231, 242 (1966) (highly unlikely that the new Seeger standard will significantly raise
the number of exemptions).
112. In Conscience, The Constitution, And The Supreme Court-The Riddle of
United States v. Seeger, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 306, Abner Brodie and Harold P.
Southerland contend: "There is no reason to suppose that the sincere nonreligious

105.
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any extension of the exemption to all selective religious objectors
would open the floodgates to spurious claims. 13 Justification for the
decision was also given in the name of administrative efficiency." 4
If it is recognized, as it was in McFadden, that established
"peace churches" do exist and that the "just war" doctrine is an
integral part of the beliefs of certain churches, then to grant
exemptions only to those members of the churches who object to all
wars and not to those who object selectively is a pronounced
departure from neutrality and violative of the establishment clause of
the first amendment. Certainly this is so in spite of the contrary
assertions made by Justice Marshall in Gillette and Negre.
Another departure from neutrality was effected in United
States v. Yoder," 5 where Amish residents of Wisconsin sought
exemption from a state statute requiring a public high school
education. In Yoder Chief Justice Burger pointed to the fact that the
Amish were "aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable
religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient
segment of American society." 116 He went on to say:

[T]he Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated
the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship
of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief
and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old
Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's7
enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others."
Seemingly, Chief Justice Burger's use of a historical reference is his
way of testing the validity of a "sincere" belief, a belief that is
associated with a well-established "peace" church."l 8 But unlike
pacifist would prove more amenable to military discipline or less likely to demoralize
and infect his fellow soldiers than would his religious counterpart." Id. at 329.
113. John H. Mansfield in his comprehensive study of conscientious objectors
would deny this assertion. See Mansfield Conscientious Objection - 1964 Term, in
1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER (D. Giannella ed. 1966). He believes that
spurious claims could be handled by a response from Congress which could establish
a quota of objectors and then select a proper number by lot.
114. Clancy & Weiss, supra note 90, raise the question whether constitutional rights should be defined by administrative agencies. Apparently, the authors
believe that if it is unconstitutional for the courts to do this, so it would be also for
administrative agencies. Id. at 155.
115. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
116. Id. at 235.
117. Id.
118. Philip B. Kurland, in The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, The
FirstAmendment's Religion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1973), contends that the
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Justice Marshall, who in Gillette and Negre disclaimed any violation
of the neutrality principle, Chief Justice Burger admitted:
A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application,
nonetheless offend the constitutional requirements for
government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion. The Court must not ignore the danger
that an exemption from a general obligation of citizenship
on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment
Clause, but that danger can not be allowed to prevent any
exemption no matter how vital it may be to the protection
of values promoted by the right of free exercise.11 9
What values promoted by the right of free exercise is the Chief
Justice talking about? Since there is virtually an infinite number of
value systems of beliefs, as varied as there are people who hold them,
it is conceivable that the values to which Chief Justice Burger alludes
are those that result in fairness to all individuals. How fair is it, then,
to predicate a search for sincerity on a sectarian institutional base in
one instance, as in Yoder, and disallow it in another, as in the cases of
the selective objectors, McFadden and Negre? Moreover, if Yoder is
to be treated as a seminal decision, then it is possible that the Seeger
notion of parallelism or equivalence is in jeopardy, as it stipulates
that the sincerity of a belief shall not be confined to parochial or
traditional concepts. 120 Further, if the Yoder decision were to become
the standard for future decisions, the concept of free exercise would
be severely limited to those who can demonstrate sincerity through
an established church membership. 121 Under such an arrangement
an insincere member of a church would be afforded privileges not
granted to an intensely sincere ethical objector.
Chief Justice's narrow view that only long-established churches are to be beneficiaries of exemptions is also reflected in Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970),
where the Court sustained the validity of property tax exemptions for churches.
119. 406 U.S. at 220-22.
120. In Seeger, it was held that "the validity of what he believes cannot be
questioned .... Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs

because they consider them 'incomprehensible.' Their task is to decide whether they
are, in his own scheme of things, religious." 380 U.S. at 184-85.
121. Joseph M. Dodge II, in The Free Exercise Of Religion: A Sociological
Approach, 67 MICH. L. REV. 679, 714 (1969), argues that "at a minimum, a religion
should have a social structure that extends beyond the individual and his kin." He
believes also that any religious group and any practice it engages in should have a
history of more than a generation before it receives such benefits as exemptions. See
also Kurland, supra note 118, at 237-38. (Yoder might restrict the free exercise
protection only to well-established church membership).
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Sincerity Measured by Demeanor
It has been suggested by one court that the best evidence of a

registrant's sincerity may well be his credibility and demeanor in a
personal appearance before the fact-finding agency. 22 Demeanor,
however, can be fraudulently misrepresented.123 It is, as Justice
Jackson once indicated, an unsatisfactory criterion for testing
sincerity, since any inquiry into what demeanor elicits raises
profound psychological problems. Religious experiences, he asserted,

like some tones and colors have existence for one, but none
at all for another. They cannot be verified to the minds of
those whose field of consciousness does not include religious insight. When one comes to trial which turns on any
aspect of religious belief or representation, unbelievers
among his judges are likely not to understand and almost
24
certain not to believe him.

One commentator

questions whether constitutional

rights

should be defined by administrative agencies and feels that members
of such agencies probably favor conventional religions and regard

sincerity as related to plausibility. 25 Another critic believes that the
intensity of a belief can only be evaluated as a factual matter in
individual cases either by a jury or some agency and that this
judgment will be "largely intuitive, and therefore more or less
arbitrary, aided only in part by the science of psychology.' 26 In
Seeger the demand was that administrative officials be permitted

limited discretion in the area of determining demeanor. It was there
stated that, "in resolving these exemption problems one deals with

beliefs of different individuals who will articulate them in a
27
multitude of ways."'

122. See United States v. Simmons, 213 F. Supp. 901, 904, (7th Cir. 1954),
rev'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 397 (1955); Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375,
381 (1955) ("In those cases objective facts are relevant only insofar as they help
determine the sincerity of the registrant in his claimed belief, purely a subjective
question.").
123. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Chief Justice Stone
argued in dissent that "the state of one's mind is a fact as capable of fraudulent
misrepresentation as is one's physical condition or the state of his bodily health." Id.
at 90.
124. Id. at 92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
125. See Clancy & Weiss, supra note 90, at 115; Weiss, Book Review, 72
YALE L.J. 1665, 1669-70 (1963).
126. See Clark, supra note 86, at 334.
127. 380 U.S. at 183-85.
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The different ways by which an individual can express his
beliefs poses special problems in the determination of sincerity. For
example, if a claimant were able to use religious terminology to
describe his nonreligious beliefs, he might be in a better position to
secure conscientious exemption status.
In United States v.
Shacter,258 an avowed atheist claimed that "the highest possible value
must be placed on human life, that man's life is sacred, that mankind
is a holy entity, and that the killing of one of its parts is a sin no man
can endure, and that man has a mortal human soul."' 29 Conceivably,
had Shacter used nonreligious verbiage to characterize his beliefs,
then under Seeger he might have been denied exemption on the basis
that he was expressing essentially a personal, sociological or political
philosophy. 130 Although it can be argued that the use of traditional
religious language should be given some weight when determining
sincerity, it does not follow that "a fortunate choice of words should be
used objectively to classify beliefs as sincere religious beliefs."' 31
In Gruca v. Secretary of the Army 32 a comparison was drawn
between Gruca's rather simplistic expression of beliefs and Seeger's
and Welsh's more sophisticated fluency. The District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals took note of the fact that Gruca had been
33
denied exemption on the basis of his inability to verbalize properly.
One court has held that "an inference of insincerity could
logically be drawn from the fact that an applicant for conscientious
objector status expresses beliefs in a way which clearly indicates that
he is not familiar with them."'13 That court maintained, however,
that:
Many sincere young men use language derived from their
reading and from their moral and spiritual advisers to

128.

293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1969).

129. Id. at 1061.
130. The Seeger Court excluded those views "essentially political, sociological
or a merely personal moral code" from its definition of religion. 380 U.S. at 176.
131. See Note, Conscientious Objection, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1734, 1742-44 (1969).
See also Mansfield, supra note 113, at 11.
132. No. 23,849 (D.C. Cir., Oct. 23, 1970).
133. The Gruca case is reported in Comment, Conscience and Religion, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 583 (1971). The case was up for review from a draft board's finding that
the claimant was not entitled to be classified as a conscientious objector. The
commentator stated that "the possibility of verbal manipulation makes some
consideration of the purported objector's credibility necessary to distinguish articulate but fabricated opposition from sincere but naively expressed opposition." Id. at
611.
134. Bortree v. Resor, No. 24,607 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 2, 1971), reported in 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 583, 611 (1971).
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express their beliefs, and in so doing may give the
impression that their thoughts are not their own. Because
of this phenomenon, Selective Service Boards and the
Army must exercise great care if they attempt to draw
conclusions from the manner in which an applicant
35
phrases his beliefs.
In Seeger, the Court also recognized "that in such an intensely
personal area, of course, the claim of the registrant that his belief is
an essential part of a religious faith must be given great weight."13 6
However, there is a strong possibility that a fact finder might not
give any weight to that belief which he deems inplausible. 13 7 This
may be so in spite of admonitions in United States v. Ballard3 8 that
one's religious views cannot be subject to scrutiny or examination by
any judge or tribunal.
The Ballard case involved leaders of the "I Am" movement who
were charged with willfully and fraudulently using the mails to
solicit contributions. The Ballards professed to be divine messengers
and maintained that they were possessed with supernatural powers
for healing those afflicted with so-called incurable diseases. 39 They
also represented themselves as having ability to cure poverty and
misery. Their claims prompted certain individuals to purchase items
from them or make donations to them. Justice Douglas, concerned
with the demands of the first amendment, held for the majority
that the issues of truth or falsity of beliefs could not be submitted to a jury. 140 Echoing, seemingly, an oft-quoted comment
made by Justice Miller that "the law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no
sect,'' Justice Douglas proclaimed that freedom of religion,
[e]mbraces the right to maintain theories of life and death
of the thereafter which are rank heresy to followers of the
orthodox faiths. . . . Men may believe what they cannot
prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
135.

Id.

136. 380 U.S. at 183-85.
137. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 90 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
138. 322 U.S. 78 (1944). See also notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
139. The Ballards claimed, among other things, to have met Saint Germain
and Jesus Christ. For an interesting discussion of the Ballard case and the
implications that it holds for religious freedom, see Weiss, Privilege, Posture and
Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964).
140. 322 U.S. at 88.
141. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1977], Art. 1
190

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

doctrines or beliefs.... When the triers of fact undertake
that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The First
Amendment does not select any one group or any one type
142
of religion for preferred treatment.
His decision, therefore, can be looked upon as a refusal to distinguish
between men of sincere faith and those who deliberately set out to
3
defraud14
In Ballard, an impressive argument was also made by Justice
Jackson against using a religious claimant's sincerity as a basis
for constitutional protection. In his dissenting opinion Jackson
asserted that questions of verity of belief and sincerity are interrelated. Consequently, if an inquiry into one is not permissible, the
other one must likewise be barred. He emphasized:
[A]s a matter of either practice or philosophy I do not see
how we can separate an issue as to what is believed from
considerations of what is believable. The most convincing
proof that one believes his statements is to show that they
have been true in his experience .... If we try religious
sincerity severed from religious verity, we isolate the
dispute from the very considerations which in common
144
experience provide its most reliable answer.
If religion under law, according to the Welsh decision, involves
nothing more than a "deeply and sincerely" held belief which may be
"purely ethical or moral in source and content,' 45 and if under Seeger
the inquiry must be limited to "whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are in his own scheme
of things religious,"' 46 and if Ballard mandates that "no inquiry can
be made into the verity of beliefs,"' 47 then under the combined
322 U.S. at 86-87.
143. Jonathan Weiss, in his thoughtful analysis of the Ballard decision, asserts:
"If we combine our notion of fraudulent representations with our conception of
religious expression within a legal system predicated upon toleration of all forms of
that expression, we obtain the result that there can be no fraud in matters of religious
belief." Weiss, supra note 139, at 604.
144. 322 U.S. 78, 92-93 (1944) (dissenting opinion). Similarly, John H.
Mansfield in his comprehensive analysis of the Seeger case feels that the character of
truth of the religious beliefs must likewise be considered. He states: "Religion cannot
be satisfactorily defined merely by reference to the role that a belief plays in the life
of the believer." Mansfield, supra note 113 at 33-34.
145. 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
146. 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
147. 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). See also Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
142.

in which it was stated:
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holdings, presumably, the mere assertion by an individual that his
beliefs are religious is the only prima facie evidence needed to
substantiate the validity of the professed beliefs. What is held out to
This
be a religious claim, therefore, cannot be challenged. 48
argument might be extended even further, as was done by several
critics, to preclude a consideration of sincerity "since the degree and
nature of sincerity are integral to the religious characterization and
beyond dissection.'" 49 If this is true, then any legal attempt to
distinguish religion from nonreligion becomes nothing more than a
futile semantical gesture.
III.

THE DOCTRINAL CONTENT CATEGORY

The stipulation in Ballard that no inquiry can be made into the
truth of a religious assertion compels the notion that religious

freedom can be achieved only if the content of a particular belief 15is0
eliminated as a criterion for a legal definition of religion.
Following this line of reasoning, it is easy to conclude that no
requirement of a belief in a Deity should be demanded by the Court,
as this would constitute "content" that would establish that belief
over those beliefs rejecting the idea of a Supreme Being.

In 1961 in Torcaso v. Watkins,'5 ' the Court recognized for the

first time152 that there are certain religions that do not embrace a
belief in a divine entity. 153 Torcaso was refused a commission as a
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a
person to process a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither can
constitutionally pass laws nor impose requirements which aid all
religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs.
Id. at 495.
148. See Weiss, supra note 139, at 605.
149. See Clancy & Weiss, supra note 90. Criticizing Justice Clark's assertion
in Seeger that "the claim of the registrant that his belief is an essential part of a
religious faith must be given great weight," the authors argue: "If he had specified
what belief in what, the relevance of sincerity in his account might have been
clarified. To look for (1) Supreme Being, and (2) Sincerity, is much too mechanical a
test, for the recognition of religion prevents an analysis for sincerity." Id. at 153 n.56.
150. See generally Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, The ConstitutionAnd
the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 555 (1965).
151. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
152. However, in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), the
Court did say, "Neither can [a state] pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."
153. In a footnote, the Court conceded that "among religions in this country
which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of
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notary public by the State of Maryland because of his refusal to
declare a belief in God as was required by that state's constitution.
By invalidating Maryland's statutory classification favoring theistic
over non-theistic beliefs, the Court placed all non-theistic believers
under the protection of the establishment clause. Although there is a
suggestion in Torcaso that a definition of religion should not be based
on the concept of a Deity, the opinion did not recite facts which
showed whether the Court thought any other content requirement
was necessary. Commenting on the case, Professor Conklin asserted:
Since any attempt by a court to define or interpret the
word "religion" in the first amendment must, of necessity,
imply the exclusion of some opinions which a small
minority may choose to call religion, the plain implication
in this opinion is that any such attempt is automatically
unconstitutional. Because the term "religion" may not be
so defined as to exclude "non-believers" it must, of
necessity, include everyone regardless of their belief or
non-belief. Therefore, any attempted legislative employment of the word "religion" would be fruitless since its
meaning could never be usefully defined, either by Congress or by the courts. Any definition would have to
54
include all who "believe," even if that be a "non-belief."'
Judge Augustus Hand of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
also declared that "it is unnecessary to attempt a definition of
religion," for the content of the term, he felt, is found in the history of
the human race and is incapable of compression into a few words.'5
But what specifically is this content to which he alludes and that
history discloses? Justice Jackson in Ballard attempted one answer
by using a quotation from William James to the effect that "it is not
theology or ceremonies which keep religion going. Its vitality is in
the religious experiences of many people."' 56 The rest of the quotation
suggests what these experiences are: "[T]hey are conversations with
God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others." 367
U.S. at 495 n.11.
154. Conklin, Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of
Torcaso v. Watkins, 51 GEo. L.J. 252, 277 (1963).
155. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943), quoted with
approval in West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943)
(Frankfurther, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter was concerned for the large
number of people in the United States who held no membership in an organized
church and wondered "what claims of conscience would the Court recognize and what
would be rejected as satisfying the 'religion' which the Constitution protects."
156. W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOus EXPERIENCE (1958).
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the unseen, voices and vision, responses to prayer, changes of heart,
deliverances from fear, inflowings of help, assurances of support,
whenever certain persons set their own internal attitude in certain
57
appropriate ways.'
It is submitted that William James's view is a theological
description of religion's content, but not necessarily the legal one.
Currently in law it is debatable whether there is even a minimal
content requirement; it was the Ballard case itself, if we accept
Professor Conklin's stand, that was largely responsible for starting a
trend which culminated in Seeger, effectively eliminating any Courtdecreed content from the legal definition of religion. 158 In Seeger it is
the place that "a sincere and meaningful belief" occupies in the life of
the possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God" that
becomes the important element, a belief that is based upon "a power
or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon
which all else is ultimately dependent."' 59 External as well as
internally derived beliefs comprise the permissible belief classification. 160
Critics have not agreed in interpreting the Seeger test. In one
commentator's view the above quoted language may be said to be the
"substance" of the Court's definition of a religious belief or belief in
relation to a Supreme Being. "It assigns content," the commentator
states, "to the merely formal 'place parallel to that filled by the
[traditional] God' by telling what place.' 6' Another commentator
contends that "since the test focuses on the position that belief
62
occupies in the objector's life, it asks an ambiguous question."'
Ambiguity occurs because the belief may be both the source or the
authority for the religious objection causing varying results in the
handling of claims. If the Court treats the religious "source" of the
opposition as dispositive, "then the class of exempted conscientious
157.
158.

Id.
Note, however, an earlier state court decision which eliminated content.

Apparently the Seeger decision was patterned after the language of that case.
Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394
(1957). It was there held: "Thus the only inquiry.., is the objective one of whether a
given group that claims the exemption conducts itself the way groups conceded to be
religious conduct themselves. The content of the belief under such a test, is not a
matter of governmental concern." Id. at 692, 315 P.2d at 406.
159. 380 U.S. at 176.
160. Id. at 186.
161. See Hollingsworth, Constitutional Religious Protection: Antiquated Oddity or Vital Reality?, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 15, 19 n.20 (1972).
162. See Comment, The Legal Relationship of Conscience to Religion: Refusalg
to Bear Arms, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 583, 593 (1971).
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objectors will be more inclusive than if a religious authority for the
63
objector's opposition must be established.'

Still another commentator speculates that: "What the Court
may mean is that the religious character of a belief is determined not
by the place it occupies in the life of the believer, but by the place it
ought to occupy in his life, considering the fundamental character of
truths that are asserted."'14 Believing that there is some inadequacy
in the Seeger test inquiring into the intensity with which a belief is
held and that a distinction can be made between the quality of a belief
and its functional aspects, the same critic contends that: "[I]t is the
fundamental character of the truths asserted, and the fact that they
address themselves to basic questions about the nature of reality and
the meaning of human existence, that is the primary reason for
characterizing a belief in these truths as religious."'6 5 Assuming that
the Court means a religious belief to be an affirmation of some truth,
reality or value, he argues:
If this is what the Court meant to say, the test does have a
certain "objective" quality to it. In this respect it does not
require an inquiry into the extent to which the belief has
transformed the objector's life. It requires, instead,
attention to whether the questions to which the belief
addresses itself are of a certain character; it requires
attention to the subject matter of the belief more than the
i66
condition of the believer.
In Seeger, while the Court professed to have eliminated the
content requirement, it did. in fact defer to certain theologians for
their insights into what constitutes religion. 67 Moreover, it made the
163. Id. at 594-95. The author cites several examples. In United States v.
Shacter, 293 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968), the court focused on the source of, not the
authority for, the opposition, and granted conscientious objector status to an atheist.
The court viewed his belief as religious under Seeger without demonstrating an
authority role in his life, which the commentator believes might be done under
Seeger. In re Nomland, No. 264215 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 1968), involved an avowed
atheist with an undisputed religious background (Lutheran) who was granted relief.
The court concluded that the beliefs from which opposition was derived were
religious within the meaning of that term as set out in Seeger. In In re Weitzman, 284
F. Supp. 514 (D. Minn. 1968), where an authority inquiry was made, the court
concluded that petitioner's objections were not religious because Seeger required "some
external force greater than man's relationship to man which occupied a position in
the [objector's] life tantamount to a God or a 'Supreme Being'."
164. Mansfield, supra note 113, at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
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place that traditional religion holds in the life of a believer the
standard of reference for comparison. This not only is paradoxical, as
one writer was quick to point out, 168 but also indicates that there
might be some vestigial content test remaining in that belief
designated religious by the Court. Paradoxically, also, in granting
standing to someone seeking equal protection under the law against
an alleged discriminatory practice, the Court must first recognize the
religious character of the asserted claim even if it later were to
declare the claim to be not a religious one. 16

9

Where a doubt exists

regarding a group's religious character and where the Court assumes
without justification that a certain group is in fact religious, the
assumption of the religious nature of that group becomes normative
in that the Court is injecting its own perception of religion's content
into its decision. 170
Emphasizing that normative definitions of what is true religion
are not proper for actualizing the first amendment, one commentator
suggests the necessity of an "external referent" for religious belief on
17
the basis that "intensity of commitment would not be enough.' ,
Alluding to definitions of religion that include a relational idea, the
author contends that no "theological or philosophical assertion is
intended."' 72 Rather, he claims, "it is merely a tentative attempt to
168. Dodge, The Free Exercise of Religion: A Sociological Approach, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 679, 713 (1969). Dodge also points out that the theologians offered disparate
statements of what the core of religion is.
169. See, e.g., State v. Cubbage, 58 Del. 430, 210 A.2d 555 (1965) (involving
Black Muslims), noted in Killilea, Standardsfor Expanding Freedom of Conscience,
34 U. PITT. L. REV. 531, 540 (1973).
170. See, e.g., Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961); In re Ferguson,
55 Cal. 2d 667, 361 P.2d 417, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961). Both
of these cases involved Black Muslims. The court assumed in Ferguson, for purposes
of litigation, that Islam is in fact a religion even though there are aspects of its
practices that are not. For a discussion of these cases see Comment, 75 HARV. L. REV.
837 (1962).
171. See Hollingsworth, supra note 61, at 28. Hollingsworth suggests the
danger "in positing the minimal requirement that the religion's object be perceived as
external is that even here one may be confusing an aspect of one's own normative
definition of religion with a purely descriptive one."
172. Id. at 26-27.
Hollingsworth quotes several authorities: C.G. JUNG,
Psychology And Religion: West And East, in 11 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF C.G. JUNG
7 (1958) ("religious teaching as well as the consensus gentium always and everywhere
explain this experience as being due to a cause external to the individual"); W. JAMES,
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE, Lecture 3 (1958) (defining religion as: "the
feelings, acts, and experience of individual men in their solitude, so far as they
apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine");
E.S. BRIGHTMAN, A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 415 (1940) ("Religious experience is any
experience of any person taken in its relation to his God.").
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posit a phenomenological, generic description of religion.' 73 He
feels, therefore, that "an essential (or the essential) characteristic of
religion is commitment to something that is subjectively understood
by the believer to be other than his own self."'7 4 He indicates,
however, that the " 'locus' of this required objective content may
remain in the perception of subject-believer."1 75 He argues that his
suggestion would circumvent the problem of having to include that
objector whose only concern is to save his own skin, within the
religious classification. 176 It would seem that even as a description
this requirement would convey the notion that the Court was
approving or disapproving the content of the religious expression.
The end result could be injection of normative elements into religion's
legal definition.
This same author asserts also that the requirements of the first
amendment's religion clauses "do not preclude a rational, theologi77
cally neutral delineation between what is religion and what is not."1
He feels, moreover, that "in a practical sense these clauses require it,
lest by allowing religion to include everything it seems to have little
or no constitutional significance."17 8 There are others who would
concur in this viewpoint, emphasizing, in fact, that the necessity
arises out of the constitutional language itself, which sets down
17 9
religion as a separate category for special consideration.
173. Hollingsworth, supra note 161, at 27.
174. Id. at 28.
175. Id.
176. John H. Mansfield convincingly argues:
Is it not also true that a belief that no one would dignify as religious may
occupy an important if not dominant place in a man's life, profoundly
affecting his conduct, thoughts, and feelings? A person may make his
pocketbook his master or his stomach a god, or consider that the highest
virtue is the preservation of his own life and the advancement of his own
interests, but no one would say, except ironically, that because of his
devotion to these ends his belief in them is religious.
Mansfield, supra note 113, at 10.
177. Hollingsworth, supra note 161, at 41.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Mansfield, Book Review, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 212 (1964) (P.
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW). Mansfield maintains:
If public funds may not be used to support religious activities, the Court
will have to decide whether an activity receiving support is religious or
not. The Court must have a definition of religion. This necessity arises
out of the constitutional provisions of the first amendment. Indeed, even
a doctrine that says the Court has only to determine whether there is a
legislative classification on the basis of religion, itself requires a decision
as to whether a given classification is on such a basis or not.
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THE NORMATIVE ELEMENT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

Even if it can be argued that the elimination of any content
requirement is desirable for defining religion in free exercise
disputes, it cannot logically be maintained that content similarly
must be or can be eliminated in establishment cases. Any attempt at
an equivalency would result in gross inconsistencies. Justice Douglas
pointed to one of these when he said: "The first amendment
commands government to have no interest in theology or ritual; it
admonishes government to be interested in allowing religious
freedom to flourish."'8 0 It would be difficult indeed to sustain an
interest in religious freedom or, for that matter, to permit it to
flourish adequately, without retaining some interest in theology or
ritual, even if the interest is nothing more than a sociological
8
recognition. In Walz v. Tax Commissioner,1
1 for example, wherein
the Court upheld the validity of tax exemptions accorded ecclesiastical property in the State of New York, it was observed by
Justice Brennan that:
The means churches use to carry on their public services
activities are not "essentially religious" in nature. They are
the same means used by any purely secular organizationmoney, human time and skills, physical facilities. It is true
that each contributes to the pluralism of our society
through its purely religious activities, but the state encourages these activities not because it champions religion
per se but because it values religion among a variety of
private, nonprofit enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the Nation. Viewed in this light, there is no nonreligious mosaic, just as there is no nonliterary substitute
82
for literary groups.
If Justice Brennan's "no substitute" contention is correct and if,
according to Seeger, religion under the free exercise clause is defined
as "any sincere belief that is of ultimate concern to an individual,"
then "is government barred from adopting and endorcing policies
that express paramount convictions or ultimate concerns?"' 83 PreId. at 216. See Comment, Defining Religion: Of God, The Constitutionand the D.A.R.,
32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 555-56 (1965) ("governmental classifications in terms of
religion are constitutionally permissible, and ... a definition is therefore necessary to
delineate the scope of such legislation").
180. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
181. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
182. Id. at 693.
183. Or is government merely barred from sanctioning beliefs that occupy a
parallel position to coventional religion? Marc Galanter poses these and the following
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sumably, this cannot be, lest government lose all means of social
control. Government and the courts must at least be free to determine
what religion is for the purpose of deciding whether legislation serves
a secular or a religious purpose in order to avoid favoring a religion
18 4
or religion in general.
Articulating a Secular Norm
Theoretically, then, the mandate of allowing religious freedom
to flourish is an ultimately secular concern and not a religious one
that moves the Court into the policy-making field. There a process of
normation or a social ordering takes place, whereby the Court, acting
as a national conscience, articulates a norm that is broad enough to fit
the facts of the case before it and capable of transcending the
particular dispute. This articulation becomes the Court's rationalized characterization of what religion is in the secular sense or that
which cannot be established. Religion, then, for establishment
purposes, is supposedly an expression of a majority view.185 The broad
permissible individualized definition of religion that has evolved
under free exercise disputes is, therefore, not applicable in establishment disputes. The paradox exposed here is that any national
consensus or majority opinion impinging upon religion's legal
meaning is a contradiction of the democratic principle held out for a
pluralistic society-a principle that suggests privacy, independence,
and competition as ultimate values.' 6
provocative questions in Religious Freedoms in the United States: A Turning Point?,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 217:
If religion embraces a whole class of beliefs when they are claimed to be
such by their adherents, does it include all the beliefs of that class when
no such claim is made for them? Or when the religious characterization
is attached by someone other than the adherent himself? Is the teaching
of secular subjects in religious schools a secular matter because opponents of aid to schools deem it religious? If government is constitutionally disabled from saying that it is nonreligious when its practitioners say that it is religious, is it similarly disabled from saying that
something is religious when its practitioners say that it is not?
Id. at 265.
184. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), held that the
"purpose" of any contested law and its "primary effect" must be secular in character.
185. One court has held that the establishment clause "looks to the majority
concept" of the term religion while the free exercise clause refers to the "minority
view." Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963).
186. See Lowi, The Public Philosophy: Interest Group Liberalism,61 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 5, 22 (1967), in which the author alludes to an artificial pluralism and
suggests: "It is wrong to assume that social pluralism (which is an undeniable fact

about America) produced political pluralism." See also R.
CRACY

IN THE UNITED
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The first attempt to provide content to the religion clauses was
5 7
in 1890 in Davis v. Beason,'
a case involving members of the
Mormon religious sect. In Davis, majority will and conventional
notions of religion were clearly articulated by Justice Field, who
explained:
The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his
relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose
of reverence for his being and characters, and of obedience
to his will. It is often confounded with the cultus or forms of
worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable from
the latter. The First Amendment to the Constitution, in
declaring that Congress shall make no law respecting the
establishment of religion, or forbidding the free exercise
thereof, was intended to allow everyone under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions
respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they
impose as may be by his judgment and conscience, and to
exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may
think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others,
and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious
tenets, or the modes or worship of any sect .... It was never
intended or supposed that the Amendment could be
invoked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order and morals of

society ....

188

The Court went on to say that "however free the exercise of religion
18 9
may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of the country.'
From the secular vantage point of 1890, religion is viewed as
theistic in that there is deference to a Deity, involving obligations and
obedience. "Cultus" is also mentioned, which would be recognition of
"beliefs" and "ritual." There is also a standard of public morality
expressed that reflects prevalent social norms, abhorring bigamy
and polygamy and viewing them as "crimes by the laws of all
187. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). In Beason the constitutionality of an Idaho statute
which compelled oaths against bigamy and polygamy was upheld. In Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), an earlier case involving Mormons, the polygamy
issue was also presented. Although the Reynolds Court arrived at the action-belief
distinction that "laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot
interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices," the Court
never found it necessary to define "religion." See also The Late Corp. of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
188. 133 U.S. at 342-43.
189. Id. at 344.
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civilized and Christian countries."1 90 The secular will in other
contexts and in other times is not as easily discernible as in Beason.
Thus the locus of the objective content under establighment vests in
the perceptions of the individual court members as well as members
of legislatures and constitutes an arbitrary value choice that
expresses what religion is or ought to be in the legal sense. 191
Neutrality and Excessive Entanglements
The choice on which the Court predicated its decision in Walz v.
Tax Commissioner'92 was the concept of "neutrality," formulated in
Abington School District v. Schempp193 and requiring a value
judgment on a question involving the religion clauses to turn on
whether particular acts of government are intended to establish or
interfere with religious exercise or have the primary effect of doing
so. It has been recogn.ized by various critics 194 and the Court itself' 95
that most of the laws reviewed by the Court under the first
amendment are capable of producing not only one effect but a
multiplicity of effects. Since there is always the possibility that a
primary religious effect may be wrapped "in the verbal cellophane of
a secular purpose," as Justice Frankfurter once picturesquely
explained, 196 it is incumbent upon the Court to differentiate carefully
between that which is secular and that which is religious, so that
there is no violation of the first amendment mandate.
Further, the Schempp test, which requires that an effect be
primary and one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, 197 raises
190. Id.
191. Sometimes the courts engage in what they call a "balancing of interests"
technique. Since opposed values are involved and are qualitatively different, there is
no actual balancing. Rather, there is merely a judicial determination of the greater
and the lesser. In this regard see the arguments presented in Wormuth & Mirkin, The
Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254, 255 (1964).
192. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See notes 181-82 supra and accompanying text. See
also notes 207-10 infra.
193. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
194. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, Constitutional Separation of Church and State:
The Quest for a Coherent Position, 57 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 865 (1963); Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 277-78
(1968).
195. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 783 n.39 (1973).
196. United States v. Kahrigher, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (dissenting opinion). A
religious effect has been defined as "[s]tate action abridging the individual's freedom
to adopt, observe, or propagate his religion (or irreligion) through programs of
assistance, or systems of regulation." Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of Religion
Guarantees, 80 YALE L.J. 77, 98 (1970).
197. 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
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linguistic problems. Must the effect be direct, indirect, or ultimate?
The semantical distinction could be crucial to parochial schools, for
instance, that might be on the verge of closing if some state funding is
not available. 198 Moreover, the value consequences following any
differentiation could alter the secular-religious distinction and
thereby alter the meaning of religion.
In Walz, for example,
Justice Brennan assumed that since religious institutions contribute
to the pluralistic nature of American society, they must be defended
and fostered. This conscious patronizing could change a religious
institution's role, affect its autonomy and independence, and make it
"public for more purposes than the Church would wish."'199 It would
seem, therefore, that there is inherent in the establishment clause a
certain amount of coercion, in that religious organizations would feel
the need to conform lest they lose the benefits of continued
200
governmental support.
There are things that have traditionally been recognized and
universally accepted as being associated with religion, some of which
are indicated in the Beason opinion. These include places of worship,
the act of worship, and the rituals associated with worship such as
prayers, sermons, reading from sacred books, meditations, proselytizing, and sacraments. 20 1 In addition, an identification with some
charismatic leader might be included in the generally accepted
198. See Choper, supra note 194, in which the writer contends that if an effect
is to serve a religious end, "the action's purpose should not be characterized as secular
even though an ultimate or derivative public benefit may be produced." Id. at 278.
199. Justice Brennan himself recognized this discrepancy in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which held unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute
providing funds for the purchase of secular educational services from non-public
schools. It has also been recognized that "exemption policy affects the behavior of
taxpayers as well as the activities of organizations seeking to obtain or retain an
exemption. It creates competitive imbalances between exempt and non-exempt
groups providing similar services, and it may create political controversies." Note,
Religion in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 387, 397 n.6
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Income Tax Exemption].
200. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968), the Court
held that "[c]oercion against individuals in the practice of their religion" was
essential to a free exercise action, but it found no such requirement for establishment
cases. See also Engle v. Vitali, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962), stating: "When the power.
prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious
belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."
201. Recent court decisions, however, reflect a change in the commonality
view. See, e.g., Brown v. Reaves, 294 F. Supp. 808 (D. La. 1966) (church attendance
not necessary in the classification); United States v. Washington, 392 F.2d 37 (6th
Cir. 1968), (biblical citations for beliefs not necessary to an objective classification).
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category. 2 2 Built into this commonality of understanding are two
notions of religion: religion in an organizational sense that looks at
form, and religion in an operational or functional sense that looks at

substance.
This commonality view is manifested in the current Internal

Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations that classify certain
organizations, including religious ones, for property tax exemption
purposes. 203 One of the conditions for tax exemption is that the
benefiting organization abstain from certain forms of political
activity.20 4 This operational standard creates two classes of religion:
the politically active non-exempt religion and the non-active exempt
one. 20 5 Under this differentiation it can be seen that one religion is
favored over the other and an advancement or inhibition of religion is
206
possible.
In two establishment disputes, Waltz v. Tax Commissioner2o7
and Lemon v. Kurtzman,2° the Court attempted a classification of
202. Joseph M. Dodge II argues for a sociological definition of religion that
reflects traditional notions:
A religion should have a social structure that extends beyond the
individual and his kin. Moreover, the religious group (and also the
particular practice involved) should either have a history of, let us say,
more than a generation, or it should be characterized by a significant,
persisting, and organized following of a charismatic leader.
Dodge, supra note 121, at 714.
203. Treasury Reg. § 1.1511-2(a) (3) (ii) (1958) states: "[W]hat constitutes the
conduct of religious worship ... depends on the tenets and practices of a particular
religious body constituting a church." An organization is included within the term
church if it: "a) is an integral part of a church, and b) is engaged in carrying out the
functions of a church." Although this is undeniably a circular definition of church
and not of religion, it does reflect a societal view of religion in both organizational
and operational ways. See Income Tax Exemption, supra note 199, at 400.
204. The Treasury Code, discussed in Income Tax Exemption, supra note 199,
at 399 n.15, stipulates that an organization will not be exempt "if the organization (a)
contacts or urges the public to contact, members of a legislative body for the purpose
of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or (b) advocates the adoption or
rejection of legislation .... Further, in part (iii), an action organization is defined as
one that "participates or intervenes directly or indirectly, in any political campaign."
Section 1.501(c)(3Xiv) defines an action organization as one whose characteristics are
that "(a) its main or primary objective or objectives (as distinguished from its
incidental or secondary objectives) may be attained only by legislation or a defeat of
proposed legislation; and (b) it advocates ... the attainment of such main or primary
objective . ..

.

205. The distinction is valid since the Court still recognizes the beliefs of the
organization and does not penalize in that respect. Furthermore, the church is
permitted to continue its activities but only on a non-exempt basis.
206. See note 152 supra.
207. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
208. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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It must be
religion that excludes the idea of the political.
remembered that this was also the aim in the free exercise disputes
involving the conscientious objectors 0 9 In Walz the Court focused on
eliminating religious strife as a divisive political force and formulated its "excessive entanglement" standard 10 In Lemon the Court
was concerned with "religion's intruding into the political arena or
[in] political power intruding into the legitimate and free exercise of
religion."'*,
"Excessive entanglement" is a sufficiently vague concept; while
it can be read very restrictively, it also can be read with great
latitude for aid to religion depending on the societal mood and the
Court's interpretation of that mood.21 2 In Lemon, however, the broad
implication of its standard is that any act of government which
arouses or tends to arouse citizens politically because of the tenets of
their religion is constitutionally suspect. This standard would appear
to reflect more specifically the values of the Court members rather
than societal values and is seemingly more unyielding than is the
"excessive entanglement" standard.2 13
The argument that the Lemon Court presents in justification of
its new standard is that "political division along religious lines was
one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect .... [Indeed] [t]he potential divisiveness of such
conflict is a threat to the normal political process.'"2 4 By way of
explanation, Chief Justice Burger maintained that political division
"would tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency.'"15
Presumably, the value Chief Justice Burger places on these other
secular interests is of greater import than those values reportedly
209. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965); Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1969), affd sub nom. Gillette
v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
210. An argument is made that this was probably designed to replace the
unsatisfactory "purpose and effect" verbal formulations "which had left the earlier
cases with no lasting guidelines other than the court's judgment of affirmance or
reversal." Lewin, DisentanglingMyth From Reality, 3 J. LAW- EDUC. 107, 112 (1974).
211. 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
212. It has been claimed that the "impact of the Walz case will depend oi, the
content that the Supreme Court gives to the concept 'excessive entanglement'." The
Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1, 133 (1970).
213. The fact that state legislatures are vainly seeking means whereby they
can aid private educational programs through such schemes as voucher plans would
substantiate the argument that the mood of society is changing toward some support
for private schools. See generally Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the Lemon
Tree," 24 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1972).
214. 403 U.S. at 622.
215. Id. at 623.
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afforded religious minorities. What then happens to the free exercise
value? The quality of treatment value? The freedom of expression
value? And the value that attaches to the right of self-perpetuation 16 Moreover, what happens to the secular value that is held out
as the basis for the establishment principle-that of preserving a
17
neutrality towards religion?
Apolitical View of Religion: Possible Chilling Effects
Where fundamental interests or suspect classifications are
involved in statutory interpretations, courts have been inclined
Their recent disto interpret legislative purpose narrowly.2 18
position to view religion as apolitical, in the light of Lemon,
however, has prompted at least one court to interpret a statute so
broadly that a possible "chilling effect"21 9 on other constitutional
rights deemed privileged is evident.
220

In ChristianEchoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
for example, a case involving a revocation of a tax exemption for a
religious organization under the Internal Revenue Code's political
limitation,221 the Court stipulated that indirect political activity or
216. See United States v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The basis of the Yoder
decision was the preservation of the Amish religion. It could be argued that the
efforts made by religious groups to seek financial aid for their schools, as in the
Lemon decision, are also efforts towards "self preservation." See notes 115-21 supra
and accompanying text.
217. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). The Court
stipulated that the state must remain "neutral in its relations with groups of believers
and nonbelievers."
218. Several types of classifications have been viewed as fundamental: those
based on race, national lineage and alienage, and those affecting lower economic
groups. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26 (1961), in which Chief
Justice Warren formulated a minimal rationality requirement permitting "the states
a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens
differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."
Although the Supreme Court has used the term "suspect classification" mainly in
racial discrimination cases and has placed a rigid burden on states to justify their
classifications, the Court has also found use for a complementary "compelling state
interest" requirement as an equal protection test to seek state justification for
infringement of religious liberty.
219. The term "chilling effect" which appeared in Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting), depicts a concern for those
affected by consequences of some state action. See generally Note, The Chilling Effect
in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
220. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
221. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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lobbying at the "grass roots level" was included in the statutory
restriction. It was charged that the Christian Echoes organization
"engaged in a year-round mass media effort, often in connection with
specific campaigns, to oppose all 'liberal' candidates and place in
their stead candidates with a 'conservative' outlook. In practical
effect, a petitioner's opposition to 'liberals' amounted to support for
' 222
their 'conservative' adversaries. 1
The various privileged rights "chilled '223 by the decision could
include the right to observe religious beliefs without government
interference or coercion,224 the right to dissent,225 the right to freedom
of assembly, 226 and the right to the equal protection of the laws. In
222. See Brief for Appellant at 36, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), quoted in
Im-ome Tax Exemption, supra note 199, at 400.
223. The chilling effect principle has been applied almost exclusively in first
amendment cases. Justice Brennan characterized the doctrine:
To give these freedoms the necessary "breathing space to survive" ... the
Court has modified traditional rules ......
We have molded both
substantive rights and procedural remedies in the face of varied
conflicting interests to conform to our overriding duty to insulate all
individuals from the "chilling effect" upon exercise of First Amendment
freedoms generated by vagueness, overbreadth and unbridled discretion
to limit their exercise.
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 397, 344-45 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
224. See West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943),
ouerruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Barnette Justice
Jackson decreed: "If official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed
what it shall contain cannot be decided by courts, but must be largely discretionary
with the ordaining authority." He further stated: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 319 U.S. at 642.
225. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958):
To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deterrent effect is
the same as if the state were to fine them for this speech. The appellees
are plainly mistaken in their argument that, because a tax exemption is
a "privilege" or a "bounty", its denial may not infringe speech.
Id. at 518. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), wherein the Court
stated:
In the realm of religious faith as in that of political belief sharp
differences arise .... But the people of this nation have ordained in light
of history, that in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these
liberties are in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
1d. at 310.
226. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). The concern in Button
centered around publicity given certain membership lists and the effect this might
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addition, any application of the Lemon restriction of "potential
divisiveness" could constitute a prior restraint 2 7 of the right of
freedom of expression.228 Since all of the rights mentioned are
variations and amplifications of the individual's right to the free
exercise of his religion, are these rights lost when implemented
through associational or institutional religious activity?
In a number of cases in the labor relations field which question
whether collective bargaining agreements infringe individual religious liberty, the courts in their efforts to maintain labor harmony
have tended to uphold the interests of groups over individual
interestsW29 In Stimple v. State Personal Board,230 for instance, a

Sabbatarian, who was a public service employee, was fired for his
refusal to work on Saturdays. Although Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act protects individuals who seek employment from private
employers against religious discrimination, no such protection is
extended under the Act to public employees. 231 No effort was made
by the state to reinstate Stimple, and no alternative means were
suggested for solving the labor dispute, such as shifting the

individual to a work schedule that was more compatible with his
religious beliefs. Instead the Court argued:
The proliferation of religions with an infinite variety of
tenets would, if the state is required as an employer to
accommodate each employee's particular scruples, place

an intolerable burden upon the state. We conclude that if a
have on the freedom of association. There the Court stated: "These freedoms are
delicate and vulnerable as well as supremely precious in our society. The threat of
sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." Id. at 433. See also DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
227. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). The Court there stated:
There is no right in a state or an instrumentality thereof to determine
that a cause is not a religious one. Such a censorship of religion as the
means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected
by the First Amendment and included in the liberty which is within the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 179.
228. See id.; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147
(1969). In Shuttlesworth, certain civil rights marchers had attempted to obtain parade
permits but were unsuccessful. They marched and were charged with violation of a
city ordinance. The Court held the city ordinance void on its face for the reason that
the first amendment freedoms were subject to a prior restraint.
229. See Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of
Arbitration under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 632 n.158 (1971).
230. 6 Cal. App. 2d 206, 85 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 952
(1970).
231. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1964).
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person has religious scruples which conflict with the
requirements of a particular job with the state, he should
not accept employment, or, having accepted, he should not
be heard to complain if he is discharged for failing to fulfill
232
his duties.

It is difficult to reconcile the Stimple decision with Sherbert v.
Verner,233 wherein the state was similarly accused of depriving a
claimant of economic benefits. The cases were distinguished on the
basis that in Sherbert the claimant could receive unemployment
benefits only from the state, whereas in Stimple the petitioner could
find other means of employment. 2 4 By upholding the state interest or
by giving great latitude to the state in its hiring and firing
procedures, the Court is implying that governmental agencies shall
have wide discretion in their employment practices. Therefore, a
Sabbatarian's religious requirements need not be "accommodated"2 35
nor an alternate means to an equitable solution be found, as this
would constitute an "intolerable burden" for the state.
The Court sometimes makes reference to a "less drastic" or an
"alternative means" test and indicates that when it has available a
variety of equally effective ways to a given end, it chooses the
measure that least interferes with individual liberties.236 It is argued
that less repressive means are always available provided the
government is willing to sacrifice effectiveness. 23 7 Should "less
drastic" or "alternative" become the instrument for judicial determination, it would imply that the first amendment right questioned
would be entitled to absolute protection and although gains for such
rights would be assured by this method, it would be done, perhaps, at
232. 6 Cal. App. 2d at 209-10, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
233. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The case questioned whether appellant should
receive unemployment compensation because of her refusal to work on Saturdays,
her Sabbath.
234. 6 Cal. App. 2d at 210, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 799. Cf. Dewey v. Reynolds Metal
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd., 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (equally divided Court)
(mem.); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
235. See note 254 infra.
236. See, e.g., Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Rebel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961). It has been suggested that terms such as "less drastic" or "alternative
means" offer no explanation of how a decision is reached; rather, the language is used
by the Court as a device for announcing results.
237. See, Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9
UTAH L. REV. 254 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 2 [1977], Art. 1
208

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

the expense of other social or personal values.23 8 A justification for
this choice of methods can be found in Mr. Justice Black's doctrine of
absolutes and his contention that the Constitution provides an
underlying balance and is the authoritative guide for choices between
239
conflicting interests and values.
Justice Frankfurter contended that the "the Constitution does
not give us greater veto power in dealing with one phase of
'liberty' than with another. 2 40 Because of this view he denounced the
"preferred position" doctrine2 41 because it expressed, according to
him, "a complicated process of constitutional adjudication by a
deceptive formula."242 In defining the applicability of the doctrine,
Justice Rutledge, a proponent thereof, argued that "it is the
character of the right, not the limitation" that is determinative.24 3 But
Justice Frankfurter would have the character of the limitation
238. A case in point is Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1941). A ban
on door-to-door solicitation would keep out the unwanted but would also keep away
those solicitors that the homemaker might want to see. Paul G. Kauper suggests that
the alternate means approach has important implications as a limitation on the
secular purpose doctrine, "but it remains to be determined whether this test has
assumed a definitive significance in the interpretation of the Establishment Clause."
Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 269, 281 (1968).
239. Justice Black's balancing position can be found in Black, The Bill Of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865, 879 (1960): "Where conflicting values exist in the field
of individual liberties protected by the Constitution, that document settles the conflict
and policy should not be changed without constitutional amendments by the people in
the manner provided by the people."
240. West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 648 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).
241. The doctrine developed from a speculative footnote written by Justice
Stone in United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 307 U.S. 144 (1938), and has been
interpreted to mean that those laws restricting the freedoms enumerated in the first
amendment are presumed invalid on their face because those rights are held to be
more important than the other ones mentioned in the Bill of Rights. The Stone
footnote reads in part:
There may be a narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are equally specific when held to be embraced with
the Fourteenth . ...
Id. at 152 n.4.
242. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 91-92 (1949) (concurring opinion). In
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 526 (1951), Justice Frankfurter pointed out
that the doctrine was announced with the "casualness of a footnote." But see an
earlier opinion of his in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), where
he agreed with the distinction and regarded it as "basic."
243. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (quoting the Stone
footnote, supra note 241).
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rather than the right the decisive factor, 244 and would leave the
settlement of conflict between two "preferred" rights to the political
branches of government. Justice Rutledge, on the other hand, and all
like-minded activists on the bench with him, recognizing that
democratic values may conflict with the institutionalized value
attributed to a legislature, would support Justice Stone's formula and
on behalf of minority interests weigh the government restriction in
light of some alternative means to a proper and equitable solution. 245
In accord with Justice Frankfurter's stand that the legislature
rather than the courts should be the prime policy maker in the field of
social policy is Griggs v. Duke Power Company.246 The case, which
arose under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "redefines discrimination in
terms of consequence rather than motive, effect rather than purpose.'

47

The assumption underlying Griggs, according to one

commentator, "is that the Civil Rights Act protects the interests of
minority groups and their members in securing and improving
employment opportunities.'248 It is pointed out that Griggs views
discrimination not only "as an isolated act by an aberrant individual
wrongdoer that affects only an individual complainant, but also as
the operation of industrial-relations systems that adversely affect
minority group members.'2 49 It is argued, therefore, that Title VII
under the Civil Rights Act "focuses on the harm to both the group and
the individual."250
If the Stimple and Griggs decisions portend the Court's changing
view of discrimination and if values under this view are predicated
on consequences or, conceivably, on that which affords the greatest
good for the greatest number, then individual rights, accordingly,
emerge as manifestations of secondary importV51
244. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
245. In United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1943), the correlate,
alternative means, was used. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the decision, but on
other grounds. See also Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); West Virginia St.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 319 U.S. 296 (1940).
246. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The case arose on the basis of racial discrimination
but is applicable to cases involving religion also since it defined "discrimination"
under the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
247. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Other cases affecting Sabbatarians substantiate this position. See
Kings Garden. Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974);
Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 428 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affd, 402 U.S. 689 (1971)
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THE SPECIAL BENEFIT CATEGORY FOR RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS: A DEVIATION

The 1964 .Civil Rights Act, which prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color, sex, national origin or religion,
was amended in 1972 to allow religious organizations to discriminate
in employment in all activities, not only religious activities. 252 Congress, by broadening the exception, has created a special benefit category favoring religious organizations in their hiring practices over

secular organizations. By implication, Congress has denied that any
253
"compelling" state interest exists to override the religious interest.

Since the 1972 amendment to the Civil Rights Act also provides for a

"reasonable accommodation" to religion in "all aspects of religious
an additional benefit to religion accrues
observance and practices,"
at the expense of secular organizations. By the accommodation
standard, employees of secular organizations are permitted time off

from a regularly scheduled workweek to celebrate religious holidays
or sabbath observances that do not fall on regular time-off days. In

effect, this standard creates two classes based on religion:
the specially benefited five-day eligibility class composed of
Sabbatarians and the: six-day eligibility class made up of nonSabbatarians. Presumably, the purpose of the Civil Rights Act and
its 1972 amendment was to give the broadest possible latitude to the
free exercise of religion and to guarantee that religious expression

not be "chilled" by governmental intrusion into internal religious
(equally divided Court) (mem.); Dawson v. Mizell, 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
See also Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975); Jackson v. Veri
Fresh Poultry, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. La. 1969).
252. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-1
(Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1970), stating:
This title shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.
253. The "compelling" state interest was elucidated in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963), and in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). For a less
liberal interpretation of the concept see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 384
(1974).
254. See Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(jXSupp. II, 1972)(amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2 (1970)). A
"reasonable accommodation" pertains to "all aspects of religious observance and
practices, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's
business." Id.
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affairs. 255 However, this conscious patronizing does permit religious
organizations to discriminate and has, possibly, the primary non2 56
neutral effect of advancing religion.
The constitutionality of the broadened exemption was challenged when a complaint was filed against the King's Garden
Corporation, a licensee of two radio stations, for violation of a Federal
Communications Commission rule barring discrimination on the
basis of religion in choosing employees. 251 The licensee argued that
the Civil Rights Act and the free exercise clause of the first
amendment compelled an exemption from the Commission's
requirement.2 The Commission maintained that only "those persons
hired to espouse a particular religious philosophy over the air should
be exempt from its nondiscrimination rule." Further, it stated, an
exemption would be a violation of the establishment clause of the first
2 59
amendment.
Reasoning that no religious organization has a constitutional
right to hold a broadcast license or to convert a franchise into a
"church," the Court found that the 1972 Civil Rights Act amendment
could not apply. The Court maintained that the free exercise clause
was not intended to permit religious organizations to discriminate in
staffing "a trucking firm, a chain of motels, a race track," or any
255. Senator Sam J. Erwin, Jr., in his introduction of the amendment before
the Senate subcommittee, indicated that the amendment would exempt religious
corporations, associations and societies from the applications of this Act insofar as the
right to employ people of any religion they see fit is concerned. "In other words, this
Amendment is to take the hands of Caesar off the institutions of God, where they have
no place to be." See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
1645 (1972).
256. The author of The Constitutionalityof the 1972 Amendment to Title VII's
Exemption for Religious Organizations,believes that this possibility is exaggerated
and claims: "It can be argued that the effect of the exemption is to neutralize the
impact of Title VII on religious exercise rather than to advance religion." Note, 73
MICH. L. REV. 538, 547 (1975).
257. King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
996 (1974). The challenged rule provides:
Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded all licensees or
permitees of commercially or noncommercially operated standard (AM)
or (FM) television or international broadcast stations (as defined in this
part) to all qualified persons, and no person shall be discriminated
against in employment because of race, color, religion, national origin or
sex.
47 U.S.C. §§ 73.125, 73.301 (1970).
258. 498 F.2d at 53.
259. Id. at 60.
260. Id. at 53-54. It was held that the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not supercede
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similar endeavor, 26' and felt that under the 1972 amendment such
activity would be condoned. Moreover, it was felt that the exemption
placed religious organizations in a privileged position in relation to
a "sponsorship"
other employers and that the exemption constituted
262
establishment.
being
as
barred
which is
The delimiting problem posed by the King's Garden case centers
on the meaning given the term "activities" as used in the 1972
amendment and whether such amendment preempts the Commission
rule against discrimination. The Court predicated its decision on the
basis that no constitutional right attaches to a religious organization
granted a license, and that a duty to conform to FCC rules follows
voluntary acceptance of the license.
The Court, by way of dicta, did recognize the constitutional
right of proselytizing and acknowledged that under the free exercise
2 63
clause some religious discrimination in employment is permissible.
For example, a particular religious sect should have the prerogative
of choosing a member of the sect to act as religious leader,264 and 2of
determining what qualifications are required of the leadership. 5
However, it is not clear if any other person can be a part of this
special benefit category. Conceivably, if "free exercise" permits
dissemination of a religious belief, then the category should cover
employees who facilitate in some way the actual proselytization.
The right-privilege distinction relied upon by the Court to
uphold the constitutionality of the Commission's standard has been
rendered suspect in a number of cases. For example, in Sherbert v.
Verner,266 it was claimed: "it is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial or
the F.C.C.'s regulations regarding non-discrimination and adequate constitutional
protection was afforded religious broadcasters.
261. Id. at 54.
262. For a earlier case considering "sponsorship," see Committee for Pub.
Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
263. 498 F.2d at 56. The constitutional right of proselytizing was recognized
in Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
264. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107 (1952) (appointment of clergy recognized as integral to "free exercise").
265. See Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1963); Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1920); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d
553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (female Salvation Army officer
charging sex discrimination).
266. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." 267 In Cantwell v.
Connecticut 261 it was specifically stated:
[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of
religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of
which rests in the determination of state authority as to
what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon
2 69
the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.
To require a religious organization to hire personnel who would
contravene proselytizing efforts of the hiring body or who could
conceivably inveigh upon a desired religious atmosphere would be a
violation of the religious freedom guarantee of the Constitution.
Further, to permit the Commission to determine which employees
are not crucial to the actual proselytizing is an "entanglement" with
270
religion.
The King's GardenCourt, by predicating its decision on the rightprivilege standard, left in doubt the constitutional issue of whether
the 1972 Civil Rights amendment creates an establishment of
religion. Since the narrow Federal Communications Commission rule
was upheld, the decision seemingly encroaches on religion in the
associational sense. Moreover, since the decision leaves in doubt the
scope of the term "religious" when applied to "corporation," "association," or "society" in the text of the amendment, a further invasion of
the field of religion in the associational sense is possible.
The classification problems discussed above depict the present
state of confusion surrounding the meaning of religion, especially in
the establishment sense, and the place which religion occupies in the
Court's hierarchy of values. Confusion also surrounds the importance
that the Court attaches to individual rights versus secular interests.
Nor is the confusion mitigated by the permissible deviations from the
norm that the Court has granted in several instances-a deviation
267. Id. at 404. See also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969), where it is suggested that FCC policies "cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny in the light of contemporary understanding of the
First Amendment." 405 F.2d at 1100.
268. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
269. Id. at 307. Cantwell involved a licensing requirement for solicitation of
money for religious purposes. See also Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953):
"[It is no business of courts to say that what is a religious practice or activity for one
group is not religion under the protection of the First Amendment."
270. For a consideration of the "entanglement" standard, see Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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that requires a state to make distinct religious concessions in

27 1
contradiction to what seemingly is a paramount state interest
Furthermore, the confusion is compounded when it is seen that the
Court is capable of making different value judgments and of
272
reaching different end results from the same secular base point.

Apparently, there is a lack of a coherent system of values in
establishment disputes that accounts for most of the confusion.
Various suggestions given as a paramount principle or value have

been offered as guides both by judges and by commentators and have
received some consideration by the courts.273 Even though there is
merit and some legitimacy in all of the guides offered, there is, as

Herbert Wechsler once indicated, "no simple basis for determining
priorities of values having constitutional dimension."2 74 Also, since no
single constitutional test of meaning has yet appeared to command
271. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state's interest in
providing a high school education for all its children eroded by exception granted
Amish children); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964) (Navajo Indians practicing peyote cultism as part of their belief spared the
incident of local narcotics restrictions imposed by a state whose concern was for the
health and welfare of its citizenry). But see Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th
Cir. 1967), rev'd. on other grounds, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (Leary claimed narcotics to be
crucial to his religion, but was denied relief); Native American Church of Navajoland
v. Arizona Corp., 329 F. Supp. 907 (D. Ariz. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 901 (1972). See also
People v. Marquis, 291 Ill. 121, 125 N.E. 757 (1919) (exemption for sacramental wine
during Prohibition upheld); In re Jenison, 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1964)
(Seventh Day Adventist committed to universal forgiveness and opposed to judging
her fellow man exempted from jury service).
272. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Both cases involved identical laws pertaining to a
required Sunday closing of business establishments. Braunfeld was reviewed as a
free exercise violation and McGowan as a possible establishment implementation. Cf.
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (both cases arising out of the same set of facts
resulting in different treatment for petitioners).
273. Value guides that have been suggested include: "neutrality," "no religious classification," "complete church-state separation," "freedom of mind," "no
imposition,". "open society," and "voluntarism." V. BLUM, FREEDOM IN EDUCATION:
FEDERAL AID FOR ALL CHILDREN (1965); P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW OF
CHURCH AND STATE (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (rev. ed.
1967); Dixon, Religion, Schools and the Open Society: A Socio-ConstitutionalIssue, 13
J. PUB. L. 67 (1964); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, And Doctrinal
Development: Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle,81 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1968);
Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J.
692 (1968); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959); Note, Toward Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE
L.J. 77 (1970).
274. Toward Neutral Principles Of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
25 (1959).
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majority support in the Supreme Court, doctrinal development and
substantive interpretation remain confused.
Some meaning of
religion, however, has surfaced in the Court's opinions. What follows
is a delineation of these definitional elements.
VI.

RELIGION DELIMITED

Although the Court in United States v. Seeger was, strictly
speaking, interpreting an act of Congress, 275 there is agreement
among commentators on Seeger that the Court's reading of "religion"
276
under the act can go beyond mere statutory interpretation.
The SEEGER-WELSH Formula: Broadening the Meaning of Religion
Seeger recognized that some beliefs which the holders may
characterize as moral and "which are based upon a power or being, or
upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate" are religious beliefs
withing the meaning of the statute, "no matter what they are to the
holders or are in fact.' 7 7 The Seeger Court also interpreted belief in a
"Supreme Being" to mean theism, and theism to mean a belief that
refers to an ultimate concern. Conceivably, it does not matter
whether the belief is capable or incapable of being articulated, nor
does it matter whether the belief is internally derived or externally
compelled. Since the subjective notion of "ultimateness" must vary
with individuals, the Court's use of the term was employed apparently to bring all religious beliefs within the scope of the military
service exemption 78 But what constitutes an ultimate concern in the
context of Seeger?
Because the Court found difficulty in articulating precisely
what it meant by "ultimateness," critics were quick to point out that
virtually anything could be classified as an ultimate concern in
275. The Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 6(j), 62 Stat. 612
(June 24, 1948), states:
Religious training and belief in this connection means an individual's
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those
arising from any human relation but does not include essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral
code.
276. See, e.g., Mansfield, supra note 113; Giannella, supra note 91, at 1425.
277. 380 U.S. 163, 183 (1965).
278. The Court admitted that its construction "avoids imputing to Congress
an intent to classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others,
and is in accord with the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for
those whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets." 380 U.S. at
176.
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2 79
someone's subjective view-even, perhaps, a man's bank account.
Obviously, the Court did not intend such a result and a careful
reading of the Seeger decision refutes such criticism. "Ultimateness"
must be read in light of what beliefs were excluded from the Court's
classification-those which are not sincerely held and beliefs that are
"essentially political, sociological or economic," or a "merely personal
2 80
moral code."

The favorable reading of a statement by a leader of the Ethical
Culture Movement to characterize Seeger's nontheistic views provides some indication of what the Court had in mind when it spoke in
terms of an ultimate concern:
Instead of positing a personal God, whose existence man
can neither prove nor disprove, the ethical concept is
founded on human experience. It is anthropocentric, not
theocentric.. Religion,' for all the various definitions that
have been given it, must surely mean the devotion of man
to the highest ideal that he can conceive. And that ideal is a
community of spirits in which the latent moral potentialities of men shall have been elicited by their reciprocal
28 1
endeavors to cultivate the best in their fellow men.
Here then is a suggestion that religion is a devotion to some abstract
concept similar to Seeger's self-identification with a "belief and
2 2
"Ultidevotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes."
mateness," apparently, is linked to some ethical concept of "good." It
is a subjective notion capable of having variant meanings, but since
the definition alludes to an external component or a reciprocal
relationship to "community," which seeks to "cultivate" the "best" in
men, the ultimate belief cannot be merely personal.
Seeger, with its test asking whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of the possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God, left unanswered several
questions concerning proper standards for measuring "sincerity,"
"ultimateness," and "parallel position." Would a sincere belief in
hedonism, demonism, or use of hallucigenic drugs qualify? Further,
from what source must religious beliefs be derived? Does one who
adheres sincerely to some moral principle outside his own selfcentered existence come under the first amendment's free exercise
protection?
279. See
280. 380
281. Id.
282. 380

Mansfield, supra note 113, at 34.
U.S. at 165.
at 183, quoting D. Muzzy, ETHICS As A RELIGION 95 (1951).
U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
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Since Seeger eliminated any requirement of affirmation of belief
in a Deity, it could conceivably be argued that Seeger made it
logically impossible for even an atheistic or a nonreligious objector to
fall outside the exempted class. As one commentator points out,
every sincere disbeliever either,
adheres to one of the variations of the theme of universal
humanistic Goodness or else his views are such that he
cannot qualify . . . for the statutory exemption afforded
those who are conscientiously opposed to the taking of life,
and if he does adhere to such a system of belief, he, ipso
facto, is not an "atheist".283
That Seeger did not hold that all moral opposition to war is religious
within the meaning of the statute is seen from the Court's refusal to
extend the exemption to objectors whose conscientious opposition was
based on purely personal moral codes.
Welsh v. United States2 4 meant the foreclosing of some of the
residual problems of Seeger and a further broadening of the meaning
of religion. Welsh excluded from the religious category all those
whose beliefs are not deeply held and all those "whose objection to
war does not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principles but
instead rest solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or
expedience. 21 5 Speaking for the majority, Justice Black in Welsh
made clear that any deeply held moral belief now would come within
the definition of religion if the belief is not a "merely personal moral
code. 28 6
Since the Court holds as religious all those whose
consciences are spurred by deeply held moral beliefs, it seems
improbable that any sincerely held moral beliefs could be characterized as a "merely personal moral code." Moreover, since the Welsh
ruling omits any substantive requirement from its definition of
"religious belief," it could be stated that there is no longer a need to
balance the religious and the secular content of such beliefs in order
to determine whether either is substantially religious or essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical. Religious beliefs and moral
and ethical beliefs are one and the same.
283. Rabin, When is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and
the Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 231, 244 (1966); see United States v.
Shacter, 393 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Md. 1968), where the court granted an avowed atheist
conscientious objector status under the Act as interpreted by Seeger.
284.
285.
286.

398 U.S. 333 (1970). See notes 53-72 supra and accompanying text.
398 U.S. at 339-40.
Id. at 343-44.
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It is the elimination of all substantive content in the SeegerWelsh definitions of religion that has given commentators their
broadest base for criticism. Those who object to the standard that has
evolved maintain that religion cannot be satisfactorily defined
merely by reference to the role that the belief plays in the life of the
287
believer and that substantive considerations must also be had. If
the Seeger-Welsh norm relates only to claims of conscience, including
both sincerely held religious beliefs and non-religious consciencebased beliefs, then those claims of exemption prompted by opportunism, expedience, or convenience will not qualify. This is true not
289
because the Court is precluded by the Ballard28 8 and Torcaso
holdings from inquiring into the truth or verity of a belief, but
because such self-serving beliefs impose no affirmative moral or
ethical duty related to an ultimate concern.
Compelling State Interest-The Need to Determine Content
Contributing also to the development of the concept of religion
in the religious liberty area is Sherbert v. Verner.290 Sherbert moved
the protection of conscience from an almost nonexistent right under
the Schempp "secular regulation" rule2 91 to a formidable defense
position requiring the "compelling state interest" test.2 92 The
standard which it established is open to criticism because of the
difficulty of its application. Aside from the desirable effect of
protecting conscience against a discriminatory law or the unintended
effect of a purely secular law, the Sherbert rule, again because of
Ballard and Torcaso, encounters difficulty in distinguishing religion
from non-religion and in providing a proper standard for weighing
the sincerity factor. 293 It thus leaves open the possibility of a neverending number of spurious claims and deprives the rule of all but
limited utility.
287. See Mansfield, supra note 113; Rabin, supra note 283.
288. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
289. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
290. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
291. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
292. Under the Sherbert test, the claimant must demonstrate that there is a
burden on free exercise of religion caused by a state regulation. Once this has
been done, the state must show its "compelling" interest in maintaining a secular
rule. Further, even if there is a sufficient secular reason for a rule, the state has the
additional burden of showing that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat
such abuses." 374 U.S. at 407.
293. See Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law, 73
YALE L.J. 593 (1963).
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However, if the Seeger test were given general application in
constitutional interpretation, it could "provide for much of the
selectivity among free exercise claims needed to implement Sherbert." 2 94 The Seeger test and the Sherbert rule can "mutually reinforce
each other when religion is interpreted as in Seeger," but first it must
be recognized that "arguments against the constitutionality of
inquiring into a claimant's sincerity are appropriate only in specific
instances and do not pertain in the typical free exercise claims that
95
Sherbert would sanction."2
For this reason two formulations of religion appear to be needed
in the free exercise area: one which, because "the law knows no
heresy,"296 ignores the content of a belief, and the other which
considers content to determine what to weigh when religious and
secular interests are opposed, particularly when a strong state interest
is at stake.
The Amish case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 297 illustrates the use of the
latter formulation and provides an example of how the SeegerSherbert rule broadens the meaning of religion under law. In cases
where claimants assert a free exercise right, the threshold question is
whether the claim is truly religious. In Yoder, the Court held that the
Amish claim, that a compulsory education statute infringed their
religious freedom, was religious because it was, "not merely a matter
of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by
an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.2 98
These words of the Court provide a description of religion in an
organizational sense, a formulation in contrast to the functional
definition adopted in the Seeger case. While Seeger's requirement of
"a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of [others]"' 9 is
appropriate in individual conscientious objection cases, more is
needed in cases where overwhelming state interests must also be
accommodated. If it were otherwise, a court once stated, "the fabric of
society might be pierced and fatally rent by a religious belief

294.

One author discusses this point in relation to the hedonist who may

sincerely claim that he has an obligation to pursue pleasure and avoid pain but who
cannot maintain "that he has an obligation to do so." Killilea, Standards for
Expanding Freedom of Conscience, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 531, 546-47 (1973).
295. Id. at 533.
296. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).
297. 406 U.S. 203 (1972).
298. Id. at 216.
299. 380 U.S. at 176.
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sincerely held by an individual in action or in non-action damaging to
the continuing existence of peace and order in the community.' 00
In Yoder, the "compelling state interest" test of Sherbert was
applied. The state was required to show with particularity how its
admittedly strong interest in education would be adversely affected by
an exemption for Amish children. The Amish community had to show
that its religion was burdened by the secular rule. The case
illustrates the principle that as the degree of state interest in a secular
regulation increases, the religious burden which must be shown to
outweigh it also increases. The Yoder ruling confirms the Sherbert
formula and supplements Seeger- Welsh by adding the organizational
dimension to the evolving constitutional teaching on religion in the
free exercise area.
An Expanded View of Religion in Establishment Cases?
The establishment clause of the first amendment is popularly
rendered as "separation of church and state," a formula which
converts the word "religion" into "church" and tends to limit its
meaning to institutional religion and what institutionalized religion
does. By "separating" religion from government in this sense, the
Constitution provides a setting in which each society is free to use its
own powers to seek its own goals. This popular conception has been
fortified by rulings of the Supreme Court since World War II.
On various occasions, notably in the Everson,30 1 Schempp,30 2 and
Walz 303 cases, the Court has stated that the government may not
establish, sponsor, support financially, or become actively involved or
entangled with religion. The use of such verbs suggest that it is the
activities more than the beliefs of persons or groups which are the
amendment's concern. The doctrines publicly professed and propagated, the moral and ethical practices, and the modes of worship
which religious bodies adopt may not be "established."
The
government may not favor or disfavor religion, advance or inhibit it,
encourage or discourage its acceptance or practice, or become
actively involved in either supporting or impeding its efforts.
The judgment of governmental acts challenged as "establishing
religion" has turned on the meaning assigned to the expressions "aid
300. People v. Woodruff, 26 App. Div. 2d 236, 239 (1966), affd, 21 N.Y.2d 848

(1968).
301. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
302. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
303. Walz v. Tax Comm'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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to religion" and "inhibition of religion."
While support and
opposition can usually be discerned without difficulty, establishment
cases present a special problem, in that the matter supported or
inhibited is not entirely clear. The uncertainty of the Court itself is
seen in the words of Justice Black, who, speaking for the majority in
Everson, said that the establishment clause means "at least" the
following activities:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid
all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institution, whatever they may be
called or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and state."304
Whether and if additions might be made to his list Justice Black left
to a future day. His is an open-ended approach which has not always
been helpful in the analysis of religion in the Constitution.
Some matters, however, were settled in the Everson statement.
A church-that is, an organized body of believers, worshipers or
practitioners of certain ethical standards-is religious. Profession
(and non-profession) of a church's creed, attendance (and nonattendance) at church come under the religious heading. Whatever
they are called, religious institutions and their activities are excluded
from the scope of supportive and inhibitory action by the government. Government participation, open or secret, in the activities of
''religious organization and groups" is forbidden under the clause.
These statements make clear that the area of life associated with
church activity-creeds, moral codes, ritual-is a religious field in
the establishment sense, as are its counterparts, non-membership in a
church and non-participation in any ecclesiastical activities.
304. 330 U.S. at 15-16 (1947).
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This is a natural and obvious meaning of the term-uncontested
in the free exercise field-but, according to Justice Black, it is not
offered as comprehensive or exhaustive. What else might religion
mean in the establishment area?
In particular, is there any
development in the establishment sense comparable to the SeegerWelsh result in the free exercise field?
Additional elements of the Court's understanding of religion for
establishment purposes are gathered from a wide variety of cases.
The "law knows no heresy" principle of Watson v. Jones3 5 is an
exclusionary rule calling for self-restraint by the Court in the
theological field. Whatever the merits of conflicting parties in
religious or theological disputes, their solution by judicial action is
banned by establishment considerations.
In Watson the Court
declined to determine which of two competing groups of members
was the rightful owner and occupant of a Presbyterian church. This
decision tells what the Court's position must be in relation to religion
rather that what religion itself is, but it does identify family disputes
by church groups as religious matters outside the Court's jurisdiction.
In other cases the Court has specified areas which the establishment clause forbids the government to enter. Torcaso30 6 ruled that
the State of Maryland could not validly require a profession of a
30 7
belief in God as a qualification for public office. The Epperson
decision denied to the State of Arkansas the authority to bar from the
public school curriculum the teaching of evolution on the grounds
that it was contrary to Scripture. In Murrayv. Curlett308 and Engle v.
Vitale3 9 the Court invalidated as violative of the establishment clause
legally prescribed prayers in public schools. The Schempp310 case
excluded from the legitimate scope of the police power the compulsory reading of Scripture in public schools. In the line of cases
beginning with McCollum v. Board of Education31 1 and continuing
through Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,3 12 the Court has forbidden financial aid to church-related
schools.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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In each of these cases the simple fact of aid to religion was the
constitutional flaw. The form or amount of the aid was of no import,
nor was popular support and endorsement of the aid. In Torcaso only
one religious doctrine. God's existence, was contained in the prescribed oath. The prayer in Engle was brief and intentionally nondenominational; in Murray it was the Lord's Prayer, revered by most
and recited by many Americans, that was the single issue. It was a
sacred book, commonly called Holy Scripture, whose content was
aided by the compulsory education law in Schempp. In Nyquist and
the other school cases, the invalidated policies entailed some amount
of aid to the churches operating the private schools involved.
Through the application of the Everson aid-to-religion standard
to these cases, the Court has developed an expansive notion of religion
which requires an element associated with doctrines, practices, or
ritual observances related to the Supreme Being. Whether it be a
theistic oath, a publicly prescribed prayer, a recitation from a
revered book, a school curriculum policy, or financial assistance to
churches in their educational efforts, the governmental policy
involved, if supportive or inhibitory, is violative of the establishment
clause. By thus expanding the field of religion, the Court has reduced
the scope of government's jurisdiction.
Does the Seeger- Welsh definition have any application to establishment cases? It can in certain instances. If a government policy
provides constitutionally valid benefits to religiously oriented groups,
such as property tax exemption for churches, programs of released
time for religious instruction in public schools, or draft exemptions
for ministerial students, it may not discriminate against serious
religious claimants. The question of what is religion in such cases
can be answered by the Seeger-Welsh formula.
In Everson, the New Jersey bus case,31 3 the Court used an
expression which has in the main passed unnoticed, but which raises
a very serious question which may have a dire effect on the very
religious liberty that the establishment clause purportedly is designed to protect. In attempting to describe the meaning of the
establishment clause, the court noted: "Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
314
of any religious organization or groups and vice versa."
It is the vice versa formulation that is questionable, particularly
in light of the presumption that the establishment clause was
313. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
314. Id. at 15-16.
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designed to operate solely as a restriction on government. Vice versa
suggests that the clause can be applied directly as a restraint on
religious institutions. That this application was made in the 1973
ChristianEchoes3 15 case is evidence of the more restrictive view held
out for religion under recent establishment interpretation.
Penalizing religious organizations whose members engage in
religiously motivated expressions that may touch upon some current
political issue produces a chilling effect not only on the free exercise
of religion, but also on other constitutional rights. Moreover, the
penalizing negates the concept of political pluralism that is held out
as integral to our democratic system of government. Negated also is
the concept of neutrality advanced as the proper standard to be
applied in establishment disputes. This negation results from the
Court's failure to take into consideration the basic nature of the
American religious society. That this error did not affect a lower
court's discerment can be seen from its characterization of religion:
Religion includes a way of life as well as beliefs upon the
nature of the world and the admonitions to be "Doers of the
word and not hearers only" (James 1:22) and "Go ye
therefore, and teach all nations" (Matthew 28:19) are as old
as the Christian Church. The step from acceptance by the
believer to his seeking to influence others in the same
direction is a perfectly natural one, and it is found in
countless religious groups. The next step, equally natural,
is to secure the sanction of organized society for or against
certain outward practices thought to be essential. Thus we
had Sunday observance laws ....
The advocacy of such
regulation (prohibition) before party committees and legislative bodies is a part of the achievement of the desired
result in a democracy. The safeguards against its undue
extension lie in counter-pressures by groups who think
differently and the constitutional protection, applied by
courts, to check that which interferes with freedom of
16
religion for any
Furthermore, the entanglement standard formulated in the
Walz decision 31 7 that bars excessive involvement of government with
315. Christian Echoes Nat'l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849
(10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
316. Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 122 F.2d 108, 110 (3d Cir. 1941),
quoted in Income Tax Exemption, supra note 199, at 408-09.
317. Walz v. Tax Comrn'r, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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religion can be read in light of Christian Echoes in two ways. If
interpreted as in Walz, government is restricted from scrutinizing
the activities of religious groups to determine whether their activities
are either political or religious. If the "excessive entanglement"
standard is hinged to the vice versa formulation of Everson, then it
could mean a substantiation of the apolitical view of religion that
ChristianEchoes has generated.
CONCLUSION

The current teaching of the Supreme Court on the meaning of
religion in the Constitituion is a mixture of tradition and change. The
conventional concept of religion-a systematic body of doctrinal,
ethical, and ceremonial elements related to the place of the Supreme
Being in the life of man-has continued to be central. This
combination of dogma, ritual, and moral rules is commonly referred
to as a faith, and a group of person sharing a faith is usually called a
church. There has not been nor is there today any question that a
faith or a church is religious in the constitutional sense. Individual
persons professing a faith or claiming membership in such a church
enjoy the protection of both religion clauses. Corresponding to the
protection of churches and individual believers is that of persons or
groups who choose not to join a church or accept any religious
guidelines. The freedom not to embrace a religion is itself a religious
stand protected by the first amendment.
On the other hand, cases involving the free exercise and
establishment clauses have combined to produce an expanded
meaning of religion, especially since World War II. Suits seeking to
enlarge the area of constitutionally protected religious freedom have
resulted in the Seeger-Welsh formula, which regards religion as
related to the ultimate concern in the person's hierarchy of values and
looks for "a sincere and meaningful belief occupying a place in the
life of the possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God." Likewise, suits designed to obtain or retain state benefits for
religious interests, or to eliminate state support of religion, have also
expanded the meaning of religion in the establishment sense. The
area of American life to which government aid must be denied
beause it has been judged religious has been considerably enlarged.
These traditional and recent teachings of the Supreme Court
combine to provide the following descriptive definition of religion for
constitutional purposes; that is religious which is related by doctrinal, ethical or ritualistic consideration to the Ultimate Concern
(identified as God, Nature, Humanity, or other) in the life of an
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individual or group, the belief or faith to which all else is subordinate
and which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that
filled by the orthodox belief in God, giving fundamental meaning to
life and dictating standards of belief, conduct or worship. Whatever
satisfies the terms of the description is entitled to protection under
the free exercise clause and, by the same token, is disqualified from
governmental assistance by the establishment clause.
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